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THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF
DEKLEWA: INEQUITABLE AND UNJUST
RESULTS FOR CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY EMPLOYERS
[W]e conclude that the statutory benefits from the announced

changes in 8(l) law.

..

far outweigh any hardships resultingfrom

immediate imposition of those changes."
Application of the Board's new 8() principles here and to all
pending cases will undoubtedly impose on some parties certain obligations and liabilities they would not have incurred under exmust
isting law. At most, however, any additional burden imposed
2
involved.
contract
the
of
duration
the
for
only
be borne

National Labor Relations Board
it
Of relative justice law may know something; of expediency
3
knows much; with absolute justice it does not concern itself

Oliver Wendell Holmes
I.

INTRODUCTION

In John Deklewa & Sons,4 the National Labor Relations Board
5
(hereinafter "NLRB" or "Board") abruptly discontinued its adher1. John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1389 (1987) (Decision of February 20,
1987 by Chairman Dotson and Members Johansen, Babson, and Stevens), enforced sub nom.
International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB,
843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Deklewa v. NLRB, 488 U.S. 889 (1988).
2. Id.
3. 0. HOLMES, THE WORKS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 324 (1891) (writings by Oliver Wendell Holmes, American author and physician).
4. 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987).
5. See id. at 1389 n.61. In Deklewa, the NLRB recognized that "some may contend
that the new law announced today represents a sharp departure from past precedent .

. . ."

Id.

at 1389. Member Stevens was one of those individuals. He specifically believed that Deklewa
represented an "'abrupt' departure from past precedent .... " Id. at 1389.
In addition to this author, many commentators have regarded Deklewa as a complete
turn-around in the NLRB's treatment of construction industry prehire agreements. See, e.g.,
C. Murphy & P. Miscimarra, Pre-hire Agreements and the NLRB's Deklewa Decision: A
Supplemental Evaluation of Collective BargainingAlternatives to H.R. 281 1-2 (Mar. 5.
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ence to its then-existing body of law interpreting and applying section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter
"NLRA").' The Board found that minor adjustments to section 8(f)
law regarding construction industry prehire agreements would not
rectify the deficiencies in its prior interpretation of that Section.7 As
a result, the Board abandoned and overruled its existing interpretation" which was originally announced in R.J. Smith Construction
Company9 and upheld in later cases, culminating in the Supreme
Court's Higdon1° opinion.
The NLRB's sharp departure from prior section 8(f) law affected construction industry prehire agreements in two ways. First,
the Board announced the end of the "conversion doctrine"1 by holding that a section 8(f) contract could no longer be converted to a full
NLRA collective bargaining agreement absent an election and certification of majority status by the union. 12 Second, the Board overruled the holdings in R.J. Smith and Higdon which had allowed a
section 8(f) agreement to be unilaterally voidable by the respective
employer or union during the term of the agreement.'3 Accordingly,
1987) (unpublished memorandum prepared for the Associated General Contractors of
America) (stating that "Deklewa can be fairly characterized as the single most important
development in construction industry labor law since the 1959 amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act."). See .also Mourey, PrehireAgreements: Do the Deklewa Rules Effectuate Labor Policy?, 11 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 21, 21 (Jan. 1991) (describing Deklewa as a
"dramatic reinterpretation of Section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act); Comment,
Recent Developments in Construction Industry Bargaining: Doublebreasting and Prehlre
Agreements, 53 Mo. L. REv. 465, 486 (1988) (authored by Lynne C. Lamy) (characterizing
Deklewa as "startling" and a "180 degree turn" in the NLRB's treatment of prehire agreements). Mourey notes that the NLRB's abrupt reinterpretation of prehire agreements has "left
employers, unions, and employees in the construction industry scrambling to understand the
ramifications of the decision and to modify their behavior accordingly." Mourey, supra, at 21
(citing "Deklewa Developments" issued by General Counsel to United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America (Summer 1989)).
6. 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377, 1389.
7. Id. at 1380 n.16.
8. Id. at 1377-78.
9. 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971), enforcement denied sub nom. Local 150, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. N.L.R.B., 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
10. NLRB v. Local Union 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Structural and Ornamental Iron
Workers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978) [hereinafter Higdon].
11. The "conversion doctrine," set up by the NLRB in R.J. Smith, allowed the conversion of a prehire agreement into a standard collective bargaining agreement, effectively operating to force a construction employer, unlike all other employers, to bargain with a union whose
majority status has never been established. See International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 772 (3d Cir. 1988) [hereinafter
Ornamental Iron Workers].
12. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377.
13. Id. at 1377-78.
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Retroactive Application of Deklewa

the Board extinguished the unilateral repudiation rule which it had
endorsed and applied for sixteen years.
After setting forth its new interpretation of section 8(f) law, the
Board concluded that its new interpretation should be immediately
applied retroactively "to all cases pending in whatever stage." 14 Although the Board noted that some parties who undoubtedly had relied on its prior interpretation would be subjected to new obligations
and liabilities that they would not have incurred under then-existing
law, it nevertheless determined that retroactive application was
justified. 15
Since Deklewa in 1987, six different United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals have confronted the changes promulgated by the
Board's new interpretation of section 8(f) law.1" Even though most
of these courts approved and adopted the NLRB's new interpreta-7
tion, these courts split on whether to apply Deklewa retroactively.'
Specifically, the six different circuit decisions have resulted in a
draw: three circuits in favor of the retroactive application of
Deklewa and three circuits against retroactivity.
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that the retroactive
application of the Board's new interpretation announced in Deklewa
effectively punishes construction industry employers for conduct that
was lawful at the time it had occurred, works manifestly inequitable
and unjust results, and should not be applied to all pre-Deklewa repudiation cases, especially those cases involving "strictly historical
disputes."18 First, this Note will provide the background history of
construction industry prehire agreements including their common industry origin, their statutory approval, and the NLRB's reversal of
interpretation in Deklewa.19 Second, this Note will discuss retroactivity, in general, 20 and the decisions of the various courts of appeals
14. Id. at 1389.
15. Id.
16. See infra notes 127-377 and accompanying text (discussing the six different circuit
cases which have addressed retroactive application of Deklewa).
17. See infra notes 127-377 and accompanying text (analyzing in detail the decisions of
the various courts of appeals cases for and against the retroactive application of Deklewa).
18. Strictly historical disputes are disputes in which "a representation election can no
longer be effectively held." See Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of
Laborers, 895 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Trustees of the Nat'l Automatic Sprinkler Indus. Pension Fund v. American Automatic Fire Protection, 680 F. Supp. 731, 735 (D.
Md. 1988)).
19. See infra notes 24-84 and accompanying text (providing in detail the background
history of construction industry prehire agreements).
20. See infra notes 90-126 and accompanying text (discussing in general retroactivity
including the NLRB's retroactive application of new standards and policies, and retroactivity
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cases for and against the retroactive application of Deklewa.21 Third,
this Note will align the various courts of appeals cases by discussing
the similarities of analysis among the circuits. 2 Finally, this Note
will present the many arguments against the retroactive application
of Deklewa and highlight the inequitable and unjust results that retroactivity places on construction industry employers.23
II. THE NLRB's TREATMENT OF CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY PREHIRE AGREEMENTS: SECTION

8(f)

OF THE NLRA AND Deklewa
A.

The Origin Of Construction Industry Prehire Agreements

The NLRA generally mandates that a union acquire the support of a majority of the employees it represents before it may act as
the collective bargaining representative for that group of employees. 2 Historically, however, the construction industry had estabanalysis in the federal courts).
21. See infra notes 127-377 and accompanying text (analyzing in detail the decisions of
the various circuit courts of appeals cases for and against the retroactive application of
Deklewa).
22. See infra notes 378-390 and accompanying text (aligning the decisions of the various
circuit courts of appeals and discussing the similarities of analysis among the circuits regarding the retroactive application of Deklewa).
23. See infra notes 391-464 and accompanying text (presenting and analyzing in detail
various arguments against the retroactive application of Deklewa and pointing out the inequitable and unjust results which are placed on construction industry employers by retroactivity).
24. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124,
1127 (9th Cir. 1988). Sections 8(a)(1), (2), and 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA collectively require
that a union possess majority support before a collective bargaining agreement can be negotiated. See id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (1988); see also ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S.
731, 737 (1961). Additionally, section 9(a) of the NLRA provides that:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA imposes on an employer whose employees have designated
or selected an exclusive representative the duty to "bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). Employees may compel recognition of
their chosen union representative as their exclusive bargaining agent by prevailing in an election and by certification of the union by the NLRB. NLRA §§ (9)(b) & (9)(c), 29 U.S.C. §§
159(b), (c) (1988). Once established, the majority status of a union as the exclusive representative of the employees is irrebuttably presumed for a reasonable period of time. Ornamental
Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 772; see Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); Toltec Metals, Inc.
v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir. 1974). "Upon the expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement, the employer may not withdraw recognition of the union unilaterally unless it has
reasonable, good faith grounds for believing that the union has lost its majority status." Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 772 (citations omitted); see supra note 47 (citing additional
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lished its own unique collective bargaining practices.25 One such
practice involved the use of prehire agreements between unions and

construction companies that allowed these companies to obtain a
guaranteed work force prior to beginning a particular job. 26 These
prehire agreements allowed the negotiation of contracts between construction employers and unions before the workers to be2 covered by
the contracts had been hired or actual work had begun.

7

The practice of using prehire agreements originated because of
the nature of the construction industry. Work typically varies by the

type of season, location and project involved.28 Unlike most workers,
construction workers do not usually remain at a job site long enough
to designate a union representative, and due to the mobility of the
industry work force, elections and NLRB certifications often prove
impracticable.2 9 As a result, there is usually no stable group of employees at a particular location--employed by the management in a
continuing work relationship-that can follow the normal NLRB
procedures for designating a union representative or participating in
authorities).
25. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1127.
26. Id. A prehire or section 8(f) agreement is a contract agreed to by a union and an
employer before the workers to be covered by the contract have been hired. ROBERT'S DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 562 (3d ed. 1986); see also NLRA § 8(f), 29 U.S.C. §

158(f) (1988).
Prehire agreements may exist in various forms according to the purpose they serve.
Essentially, prehire agreements are labor contracts between an employer and a
union that has not yet established its majority status. They may be for a specific
term or term to term, a particular project, or area wide. An employer may enter
into a prehire agreement as an individual employer, a member of a multi-employer
association, or by short "assent" or "consent" form to the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement.
Trustees for Mich. Laborers Health Care Fund v. M.M. Vander Veen Constr. Co., 736 F.
Supp. 138, 142 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
27. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprintedin 1959 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws, 2318, 2442, and in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE AcT OF 1959, at 424 (1959) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. In the building and construction industry, "it is customary for employers to
enter into collective bargaining agreements for periods of time running into the future, perhaps

" Id. In many instances, these agreements run as much as 3 years. Id. 'Since the
1 year ....
vast majority of building projects are of relatively short duration, such labor agreements neces" Id.
sarily apply to jobs which have not been started or may not even be contemplated ....
28. See Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 772.
29. Id. at 772-73. Employment in the construction industry is temporary and transitory
in nature. Trusteesfor Michigan Laborers Health Care Fund, 736 F. Supp. at 142. Employees work for short periods for many different employers. See Higdon, 434 U.S. at 349. As a
result, representative elections to demonstrate majority status were impractical, if not impossi-

ble, in a large segment of the industry since normal Board election and certification procedures
usually could not be completed prior to the end of many construction projects. See id. at 34849; Trustees for Michigan Laborers Health Care Fund, 736 F. Supp. at 142.
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a certification election.3 0

Consequently, problems resulted for both construction industry
management and its employees.3 l First, employers sought accurate
estimates of their labor costs upon which their bids would be based.32
For these employers, having a guaranteed construction union contract prior to submitting a bid was virtually a sine qua non toward
meeting this goal.33 Second, employers needed the availability of a
supply of skilled craftsmen ready for a quick referral.3 4 A substantial
majority of the skilled employees in the construction industry constituted a pool of such help centered about their appropriate craft
union.35 Last, construction industry employees desired the benefits of
union representation that were available to workers in other fields.36
Thus, in an attempt to satisfy many of these interests, the practice of
a
prehire agreements developed in the construction industry.3
In 1948, the National Labor Relations Board first asserted jurisdiction over the construction industry" and rejected the industry's
custom of using prehire agreements by applying principles that had
been developed in markedly different contexts and industries.3 ' The
Board determined that prehire agreements were illegal because they
30. See OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d at 772. It is apparent from NLRA § 9(a),
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988), and the case law construing it that the NLRA assumes that a
stable group of employees who are capable of designating a union representative or participating in a certification election are employed by management in a continuing work relationship.
Id. See generally Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 48 n.15 (1987).
However, this is not the .typical situation present in the construction industry.
For the construction employee, "[t]he occasional nature of the employment relationship
makes this industry markedly different from manufacturing and other types of enterprise. An
individual employee typically works for many employers and for none of them continuously.
Jobs are frequently of short duration, depending upon various stages of construction." LEmosL rivE HISTORY, supra note 27, at 397, 423; see Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1380 (noting that
"sporadic employment relationships" are an important characteristic of the construction industry). It is typical for an employee to be referred from a union hiring hall to one employer for a
number of days or weeks and, upon completion of the work, to return to the hiring hall for
referral to another employer. See Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1380.
31. Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 773.
32. Id.; see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 27, at 423-24.
33. Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 773.
34. LEGisLt~ivE HISTORY., supra note 27, at 423-24.
35. Id.
36.

Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 773; LEGisLATivE HISTORY. supra note 27,

at 397, 423-24.
37. Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 773; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 27,
at 397, 423-24.
38. See, e.g., Carpenters Local 74 (Watson's Specialty), 80 N.L.R.B. 533 (1948); Ozark
Dam Contractors, 77 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1948); cf. In re Johns Manville Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 1
(1945).
39. Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 773; Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1127.
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designated an exclusive union representative of the employees before
either a union election had been held or its majority status had been
tested. 40 However, the Board suggested that the construction indus-

try petition Congress to create an exception to its general prohibition
against prehire agreements. 4 '

B. Section 8Wf Of The National Labor Relations Act

In 1959, following eight years of construction industry lobbying,
Congress finally added section 8(f) to the NLRA, legalizing the use
of construction industry prehire agreements.4 2 In the body of section

40. Id.; see, e.g., Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 458, 460 (1950), enforced,
185 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1951); Chicago Freight Car, 83 N.L.R.B. 1163 (1949). "The Board
refused to make any exceptions to its general rule that minority contracts were illegal and
unenforceable." Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1127. "In a number of cases, the Board rejected the
'general custom and practice in the construction industry' and held that pre-hire agreements
were illegal and unenforceable." Id.; see also Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1380 (noting that the
Board, in a series of cases, had found unlawful the bargaining, referral, hiring and employment practices common in the industry).
41. Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 773. See generally Daniel Hamm Drayage
Co., 84 N.L.R.B. at 460-61 (stating that the "custom and practice" argument was better
directed to Congress than to the Board).
42. LEGIsLATivE HiSTORY. supra note 27, at 397, 423-24. Section 8(f) of the NLRA
provides, in pertinent part:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this section
for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to
make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment,
will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor organization
of which building and construction employees are members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in section (a) of this section [29 U.S.C. §
158(a)] as an unfair labor practice) because (1) the majority status of such labor
organization has not been established under the provisions of section 159 of this title
[29 U.S.C. § 159] prior to the making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement
requires as a condition of employment, membership in such labor organization after
the seventh day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of
the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the employer to
notify such labor organization of opportunities for employment with such employer,
or gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such
employment, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum training or experience qualifications for employment or provides for priority in opportunities for employment
based upon length of service with such employer, in the industry or in the particular
geographical area: Provided,That nothing in this subsection shall set aside the final
proviso to section (a)(3) of this section [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)]: Providedfurther,
That any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection,
shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 159(c) or 159(e) [29 U.S.C.
§§ 159(c), (e)] of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1988) (discussing agreement covering employees in the building and construction industry).
The history of the passage of the subsection (f) amendment to section 8 of the NLRA was
extremely protracted. See Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1127 n.l. "In 1951, a bill was first introduced by Senators Taft and Humphrey to allow prehire agreements, but it failed to obtain
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8(f), Congress explicitly authorized the "negotiation, adoption and
implementation of collective-bargaining agreements in the construction industry without initial reference to the union's actual majority
status and expressly provided that such agreements could contain 7day union security clauses, exclusive hiring hall referral procedures,
and training and seniority requirements as hiring priorities. '43 At
the same time that Congress adopted section 8(f), it also enacted
section 8(b)(7)(C) which, inter alia, prevents a union from picketing
approval in the 82nd Congress." Id. Synonymous bills, supported by the Eisenhower administration, were introduced in each subsequent Congress. Id. Finally, in 1958, Senators John Kennedy and Samuel Ervin proposed an amendment substantially equivalent to the original TaftHumphrey bill and it was ultimately signed into law. Id.; see also NLRB Guidelines on Construction Pre-Hire Agreements, reprinted in 1979 LABOR REL. Y.B. 349, 350 n.1 (BNA)
(describing in detail the congressional history of the passage of section 8(0). Section 8(f) was
enacted by Congress as part of the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the NLRA. Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 705(a), 73 Stat. 542.
Congress knew that these construction industry prehire agreements were not entirely consistent with "rulings of the NLRB that exclusive bargaining contracts can lawfully be concluded only if the union makes its agreement after a representative number of employees have
been hired." LEGISLATiVE HISTORY, supra note 27, at 424; see also H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., 19, reprintedin 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, 2318, 2424, and In
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 27, at 759, 777-78 (following Senate Report in discussing
special problems of construction industry). Nonetheless, Congress specifically intended to ratify the use of such prehire agreements in the construction industry. See Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d
at 1131.
43. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1380; see OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d at 773;
NLRA § 8(0, 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1988).
"The union hiring hall, a clearinghouse for both union and non-union employees seeking
work and employers seeking workers, is the means of job distribution in short-term employment industries, including maritime, construction, and longshoring." T. BOYCE & R. TURNER,
FAIR REPRESENTATION, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS, 76-77 (1984); see R. GORMAN. LABOR
LAW 664 (1976). "Generally, employers request qualified workers for various jobs and the
union provides them." BOYCE, supra, at 77. When the hiring hall is designated as the exclusive
source for employment referrals, the employer is obligated not to hire through any other
source. Id. However, if the employer enters into a nonexclusive arrangement, he is free to
reject persons referred by the union and may hire from any other source. Id.; GORMAN, supra,
at 664. The collective bargaining agreement typically defines the type of hall and the hiring
procedures to be followed by the employer. BOYCE, supra, at 77.
Hiring hall clauses require the employer to notify the union of openings and give preferencc to their referrals, although the NLRA forbids the union from discriminating in favor of
union membership in making referrals. International Union of Elevator Constructors Local 6
(Westinghouse), 204 N.L.R.B. 578, 584-85 (1978), enforced, 493 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974).
These agreements may provide for preference in referral based on factors listed in section
8(0(4) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1988). However, the NLRA does not provide an
exhaustive list of referral and hiring preference criteria which are permissible for construction
industry employers and unions under sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(3). See id. A union is permitted to ease local unemployment by giving referral preference to applicants who have been out
of work the longest, New York Lithographers & Photoengravers, Local I-P, 258 N.L.R.B.
1043, 1044-45 (1981), review denied, 742 F.2d 1439 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, Bartels v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 1245 (1984), or on the basis of various measures of seniority, see, e.g., International Marine Terminals, 137 N.L.R.B. 588 (1962).
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in order to coerce an employer to sign a prehire agreement." By
adopting these sections, Congress expressly approved the established
45
industry practices that the NLRB had previously found unlawful.
Hence, construction industry prehire agreements could designate the
union as the exclusive representative of a company's employees without a formal Board election, and the employees could, at any time,
vote to decertify the union as their representative by using the formal NLRB procedures. 46 However, the enactment of sections 8(f)
and 8(b)(7)(C) failed to resolve two essential issues: (1) whether
during its term, a section 8(f) agreement is as binding and enforceable as any other union agreement; and (2) if not, what type of actions would "convert" a prehire agreement into a definitive collective
bargaining agreement.47

Following Congress' enactment of section 8(f), the NLRB held
that an employer could not unilaterally repudiate a prehire agreement with the respective union.4 8 However, in 1971, the Board

44. OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d at 773.
45. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1381.
46. See OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d at 773, 775. However, by its express terms,
section 8(f) does not protect prehire or exclusive referral agreements in cases where the union
has been illegally "established, maintained, or assisted" by the employer in violation of section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1988). Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, in pertinent
part, makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support
to it .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
47. See OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d at 773. Another issue that Congress failed
to resolve was whether these agreements required "an employer to bargain with the union as
the employees' 'exclusive representative' after the prehire agreement ha[d] expired." Id. at
773-74. In the customary employer-union relationship, the employer is bound to bargain with
the exclusive representative even after the contract has expired. Id. at 774. Under these circumstances, recognition of the respective union may only be withdrawn if the employer has a
reasonable, good faith belief that the union does not represent a majority of the employees.
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 597 n.11 (1969) (noting that "[tihe right of an
employer lawfully to refuse to bargain if he had a good faith doubt as to the Union's majority
status, even if the in fact the Union did represent a majority, was recognized early in the
administration of the Act"); id.; NLRB v. Leatherwood Drilling Co., 513 F.2d 270, 272 (5th
Cir.) (stating that the employer "can lawfully refuse to bargain with the Union if and only at
the time of [the employer's] refusal [the employer] had reasonable and good faith grounds for
doubting the Union's continued majority status."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1016 (1975); NLRB
v. Frick and Co., 423 F.2d 1327, 1331 (3d Cir. 1970). Upon expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, both parties are not released "from the strictures of the agreement until an
'impasse' in negotiations is reached." Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 774; see generally NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Taft Broadcasting Co. v. AFTRA, 163 N.L.R.B.
475 (1967). "The employer is then free to impose terms on the employees, and the employees
in turn, may then picket, strike or exert other forms of pressure." Ornamental Iron Workers,
843 F.2d at 774.
48. See Bricklayers & Masons Int'l Union, Local 3, 162 N.L.R.B. 476, 477-79 (1966),
enforced, 405 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding specifically that the majority status of a union
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changed its position by allowing unilateral repudiation of section 8(f)
agreements in R.J. Smith Construction Company.49 In R.J. Smith
and its companion case, Ruttmann Construction Company,50 the
Board interpreted section 8(f) to mean that a prehire agreement is
merely a "preliminary step that contemplates further action for the
development of a full bargaining relationship." 51 Thus, the Board
held that until "further action" occurred, either party was free to
repudiate the agreement.5 2

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia subsequently denied enforcement of the R.J. Smith decision.5
Despite the D.C. Circuit's rejection of the R.J. Smith rule, the
Board nevertheless repeatedly applied its holding when it faced the
same issue in Iron Workers Local No. 103.1' Hence, it was not surprising that three years after the D.C. Circuit's holding, the same
issue arose again in Local Union No. 103, InternationalAssociation

of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. NLRB when
the union petitioned for review of the Board's order. 5 As was expected, the D.C. Circuit followed its own precedent and again rejected the R.J. Smith rule. 6 However, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's ruling in NLRB v. Local Union
with a prehire agreement, similar to a union's status in a traditional collective bargaining
contract, could not be challenged in an unfair labor practice proceeding); Oilfield Maintenance
Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384, 1387 & n.10 (1963).
49. 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971), enforcement denied sub nom. Local 150, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In the companion case to R.J.
Smith, Ruttmann Construction Company, 191 N.L.R.B. 701 (1971), the NLRB stated that:
[I]n enacting Section 8(f) to assist in resolving such problems, Congress merely
permitted parties to enter into such prehire agreements without violating the Act. It
does not mean that a failure to abide by such an agreement is automatically a refusal to bargain. In essence, therefore, this prehire agreement is merely a preliminary step that contemplates further action for development of a full bargaining relationship ....

191 N.L.R.B. at 702. In Ruttmann, the NLRB dismissed Oilfield Maintenance, 142 N.L.R.B.
1384, as being "primarily concerned [with] the right of a successor-employer to disavow contracts made by a predecessor" employer. Id. at 701 n.5.
50. 191 N.L.R.B. 701 (1971).
51. Ruttmann, 191 N.L.R.B. at 702.
52. Id.
53. Local No. 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1973), denying enforcement of R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971).
54. Iron Workers Local No. 103, 216 N.L.R.B. 45 (1975).
55. 535 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd, Higdon, 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
56. Id. In support of its holding against the NLRB's R.J. Smith rule, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals pronounced that "[n]o substantial advantage will be achieved by further
analysis of the details of the Board's effort here to justify its rejection of the holding of this
court in [R.J. Smith], or the post-hoc efforts of the Board's appellate counsel to distinguish the
instant case." 535 F.2d at 90.
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Structural & OrnaNo. 103, International Association of Bridge,
57
mental Iron Workers (hereinafter Higdon).

In 1978, in Higdon, the Supreme Court reviewed and upheld in
a 6-3 decision the Board's R.J. Smith rule, concluding that "the

Board's construction of the Act, although perhaps not the only tenable one, is an acceptable reading of the statutory language and a
reasonable implementation of the purposes of the relevant statutory

sections."58 In 1983, the Higdon Court's announcement that section
8(f) agreements are voidable at will until the union achieves major-

ity status was clearly reaffirmed by the Court in Jim McNeff, Inc. v.
Todd. '9
57. 434 U.S. 335, 341 (1978).
In Higdon, the Iron Workers' union originally filed suit against the Higdon Contracting
Company. Iron Workers Local 103, 216 N.L.R.B. 45 (1975). The NLRB had held that it.was
an unfair labor practice, within the meaning of section 8(b)(7)(c) of the NLRA, for an uncertified union, which did not represent the majority of the employees, to engage in prolonged
picketing in order to force an employer to adhere to the terms of a prehire agreement. See id.
at 47. The Board, relying on its R.J. Smith holding, had ordered the union to cease picketing
since the picketing was intended to coerce the respective employer to bargain with a union that
was not certified as the bargaining representative of the employees. Id. On review, the Supreme Court upheld the NLRB's decision that an employer need not bargain with a union
with which it has a section 8(f) contract unless the union can show its majority status in the
appropriate unit. See Higdon, 434 U.S. at 340-41.
58. 434 U.S. at 341.
59. 461 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1983). While, in Higdon, 434 U.S. 335, the Court addressed
an employer's obligation to bargain with a union with which it had a prehire agreement, in
Jim McNeff, the Court addressed the enforceability of contractual obligations pursuant to a
prehire agreement. See 461 U.S. at 261. In Jim McNeff, a union sued under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act to compel an accounting and payment of any contributions
found to be due to fringe benefit trust funds which the respective employer was obligated to
maintain in accordance with a prehire contract. Id. at 263-64. The Court affirmed the lower
courts' decisions and ordered payment of the unpaid trust fund contributions. Id. at 265. Accordingly, the Court distinguished the present case from the prior situation in Higdon, pointing
out that Congress' concerns in enacting section 8(f), namely that the employees have a right to
select their own representative, and that prehire agreements be voluntary, were not present in
Jim McNeff. Id. at 269. However, the Court plainly upheld its prior holding in Higdon, reiterating that prehire agreements are voidable until the union establishes majority status. Id. at
270-71.
The federal court cases following Jim McNeff and Higdon are numerous. See, e.g., Trustees of Colorado State Iron Workers v. A&P Steel, Inc., 812 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1987);
IBEW Local 441 v. KBR Elec., 812 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1987); Carpenters v. J.L.M. Constr.
Co., 809 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1987); Carpenters Local 2247 v. Endicott Enters., Inc., 806 F.2d
918 (9th Cir. 1986); Ion Constr. Co. v. District Council of Painters, 803 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir.
1986); New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Jordan & Nobles Constr. Co., 802 F.2d
1253 (10th Cir. 1986); Painters Local Union No. 164 v. Epley, 764 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir.
1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1120 (1986); Ironworkers, Local 103 v. Higdon Constr. Co., 739
F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1984); Washington Area Carpenters' Welfare Fund v. Overhead Door Co.,
681 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 926 (1983); NLRB v. Haberman Constr.
Co., 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981); William R. Nash, Inc. v. Local 719, 653 F. Supp. 1016
(S.D. Fla. 1985); Cable Guide Railing Constr. Co. v. Ironworkers, 543 F. Supp. 405 (W.D.
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C. Deklewa: The New Rules Governing Section 8Y) Agreements
And Their Retroactive Application
Subsequent case law produced a complex, fact-specific analysis
for determining what kinds of actions would "convert" a section 8(f)
agreement into a full collective bargaining contract.60 As a result, a
series of rules had developed "establishing what was, in effect, a protocol for the resolution of majority status disputes arising under
prehire agreements."'" At its inception, a section 8(f) prehire agreement was essentially a preliminary step toward the possible future
development of a full-fledged collective bargaining relationship between an employer and a union.6 2 At this stage, a prehire agreement
conferred no presumption of majority status for the union, and both
parties were allowed to unilaterally repudiate the agreement at any
time and for any reason.63 If the employer repudiated the agreement,
"the union could then litigate its status in [a section] 8(a)(5) proceeding by filing an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.'
If the NLRB determined that the union had achieved majority status at any time during the term of the section 8(f) agreement, the
agreement would be considered to have been converted into a binding section 9(a) collective bargaining agreement under the NLRA
and fully enforceable under the Labor Management Relations Act
(hereinafter "LMRA").65 "Further, if the Board found that the
union had attained majority status and that the repudiation had
therefore constituted an unfair labor practice, it could have included
in the relief which it granted an award of all payments which the
6' 6
employer had failed to make under the 8(f) agreement.
Pa. 1982).
The NLRB has also endorsed and applied section 8(f) in the same manner as have the
federal courts. See, e.g., Pacific Erectors, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 421 (1981), enforced, 718 F.2d
1459 (9th Cir. 1983); Higdon Constr. Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 45 (1975); Irvin McKelvy Co., 194
N.L.R.B. 52 (1971); Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701 (1971); R.J. Smith Constr.,
191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971).

60. OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d at 775.
61. Trustees of the Nat'l Automatic Sprinkler Indus. Pension Fund v. American Automatic Fire Protection, 680 F. Supp. 731, 734 (D. Md. 1988) [hereinafter National Automatic
Sprinkler].
62. Id.; see Ruttmann, 191 N.L.R.B. at 702.
63. National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 734.
64. Id. Additionally, the question of the union's status could be resolved by a NLRB
election conducted pursuant to a petition filed under NLRA §§ 9(c) or 9(e), 29 U.S.C. §§
159(c), (e) (1988). Id. at 734 n.3.
65. Id. at 734; see Construction Erectors, Inc. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir.
1982) (stating that if the union "later achieves a majority in a stable unit, the Board deems
the contract to be initially a 8(f) agreement that is later converted to a 9(a) agreement.").
66. National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 734.
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The complexities of the conversion analysis produced an abun' 67
dance of what the NLRB termed "fractious litigation. In 1987, to

forestall such litigation, the Board decided to reconsider the R.J.
8
Smith rule in John Deklewa & Sons." After an exhaustive review of

both the legislative history of section 8(f) and the impact of the R.J.

Smith decision, the NLRB found serious shortcomings in the law of
construction industry prehire contracts and again altered its position

by overruling R.J. Smith.6 First, the Board pronounced the end of
the "conversion doctrine" by holding that a section 8(f) contract
could no longer be converted to a full NLRA collective bargaining
agreement absent both an election and certification of majority status. 70 Second, the Board overruled the holdings in R.J. Smith and
later cases, culminating in Higdon, which had authorized a section

8(f) agreement to be unilaterally voidable by the employer during

the term of the agreement. 71
As a result of Deklewa, construction industry employers are no
67. Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 775 (quoting Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at
1383).
68. Id. In Deklewa, the employer unilaterally repudiated its section 8(f) agreement with
the union. 282 N.L.R.B. at 1376. The union then filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
NLRB, claiming that the employer could not lawfully repudiate its agreement. Id.
69. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1379, 1385. The NLRB specifically adjudged that
"[w]hen parties enter into an 8(f) agreement, they will be required ... to comply with that
agreement unless the employees vote, in a Board-conducted election, to reject (decertify) or
change their bargaining representative." Id. at 1385.
Recognizing that it was directly contradicting its previous position regarding construction
industry prehire agreements, the NLRB proffered the following justification for not adhering
to its own precedent:
We have not merely parsed the case precedent and legislative history in order to
arrive at yet another "tenable" construction of the statutory language. Rather, consistent with our mission as the administrative agency responsible for enforcing the
NLRA, we have applied our cumulative individual and institutional experience and
expertise toward achieving, consistent with our reading of the statutory language
and our interpretation of the legislative intent, what we perceive to be a better application of the statute. Given the present state of the law in this area, we see no
alternative but to exercise our prerogative to do so.
Id. at 1389 n.40.
70. Id. at 1377; see supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the "conversion
doctrine").
71. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377; see R. Pleasure, ConstructionIndustry Labor Law:
Contract Enforcement After Deklewa and Consumer Boycotts After DeBartolo and Boxhorn,
10 INDus. REL. L.J. 40, 42 (1988). The Board held, in relevant part that: (1) section 8(f)
agreements are not voidable at will by an employer, or a union; (2) prehire agreements, once
voluntarily consummated, are binding until either the agreement expires, or until a representation election is held establishing that the union signatory to the prehire agreement is not a
majority representative; and (3) an employer that unilaterally repudiates a prehire agreement
when neither of the two alternative conditions precedent in (2) above is present, commits a
section 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice. See Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377-78.
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longer privileged to repudiate a collective bargaining agreement, entered into pursuant to section 8(f), during the term of that agreement.72 "If a union's majority status is challenged, the only way it
can be tested is by a Board-conducted election prompted by a petition filed under section 9(c) of the [NLRA] . ''7 "In the interim, the
construction industry employer is required to comply with the terms
of the [section] 8(f) agreement, including the making of all payments due thereunder. 74
In essence, the Deklewa decision was an attempt by the Board
to accommodate the positions taken by both the construction industry employer and the union with respect to the enforceability of
prehire agreements. 5 In response to concerns of construction industry employees that R.J. Smith permitted management to void
prehire agreements, the Board announced that section 8(f) contracts
were no longer unilaterally voidable and were enforceable until expiration. 76 The Board also responded to construction industry employers' complaints by abandoning the "conversion doctrine," and held
that section 8(f) prehire agreements were only enforceable during
the term of the agreement and, absent an election and certification,
could not be converted into traditional collective bargaining agreements with lingering rights and obligations. 77
After setting forth its new interpretation of section 8(f), the
Board finally confronted the issue of whether its new rules should be
applied retroactively. 78 The Board noted that its usual practice was
to apply new policies and standards to all cases no matter what stage
in the litigation they had reached. 7 Although the Board recognized
that its new interpretation represented a "sharp departure" from the
R.J. Smith rule by imposing new liabilities and obligations upon
some parties that would not have been incurred under existing law, it
nevertheless determined that a retroactive application of the rule was
72.

National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 734.

73. Id.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
See OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d at 775.
Id.; see Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377.

77. Id.
78.
79.

See Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1389 (confronting the "final issue" of retroactivity).
Id.; see Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995, 1006-07 (1958) (stating

that "[t]he judicial practice of applying each pronouncement of a rule of law to the case in
which the issue arises and to all pending cases in whatever stage is traditional and, [the
NLRB] believe[s], the wiser course to follow."); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 293-94 (1974) (discussing the plurality opinion in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,

394 U.S. 759 (1969), in which the Court upheld the Board's right to announce and apply new
principles adjudicatively).
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appropriate."s

In making this determination, the Board had to balance various
competing factors. On the one hand, the Board had to consider the

potential unfairness to employers of imposing upon them additional

obligations and liabilities to which they were not subject when they
81
entered into section 8(f) agreements under pre-Deklewa law. On

the other hand, the Board had to take into account the public inter-

est in immediately implementing more effectively the policies of promoting employee free choice and labor relations stability underlying
the NLRA.82 Likewise, the Board expressed concern about being
"required for an indefinite period of time to perpetuate the administrative and litigational difficulties entailed in application of arcane
current law to all pending 8(f) cases."83
To ultimately justify the retroactive application of its new
Deklewa rules, the Board contended that "any additional burden imposed must be borne only for the duration of the contract involved,"
and that "the statutory benefits from the announced changes in 8(f)
law for employees, employers and unions in the construction industry
far outweigh any hardships resulting from immediate imposition of
those changes."84 Hence, regardless of the new liabilities and obligations imposed upon construction industry employers who have previously entered into a section 8(f) prehire agreement, the Board's deci80. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1389. While noting that "some employers have probably
relied on R.J. Smith as a means of repudiating a prehire agreement," the NLRB stated that:
[T]hat reliance interest is not a particularly strong one in light of the purposes
which Congress sought to achieve under Sec. 8(f). The interest that is entitled to
protection is the ability of an employer to avail itself of the Board processes to
determine whether there is continued majority support to undergird the union and
the agreement. The new rule, which affirms the Board's election procedures for
resolving that issue, does not seriously detract from what an employer should appropriately expect in the way of protection under the old rule.
Id. at 1389 n.61. Member Stevens believed that the rule announced in Deklewa represented an
" abrupt' departure from past precedent, especially in light of the Supreme Court's tacit approval of R.J. Smith in Higdon." Id. However, Stevens agreed that retroactive application was
permissible. Id.
81. Id. at 1389.
82. Id. The NLRB concluded that its new interpretations expressed in Deklewa better
complimented the congressional purposes behind the NLRA, and specifically, section 8(f),
which were: (1) to advance employee free choice in choosing a bargaining representative; and
(2) to provide greater labor relations stability in the construction industry. See id. at 1383-84
(discussing employee free choice and labor relations stability).
83. Id. at 1389.
84. Id. The Board stated that it was "doing nothing more than holding parties to the
terms and conditions of 8(f) contracts which were voluntarily entered into." Id. For a discussion of "voluntariness" regarding the retroactive application of the Board's Deklewa holding,
see infra notes 399-402 and accompanying text.
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sion is retroactive in the sense that any case pending at any stage of
the proceeding is bound by Deklewa, and an employer's repudiation
in reliance on R.J. Smith is improper reliance.
III. THE SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUITS IN THE RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF

Deklewa

Since the NLRB's ruling in 1987, six different United States
Courts of Appeals have confronted the changes in Deklewa.8 5 Most
of these courts of appeals approved and adopted the NLRB's new
ruling. 8a However, these courts definitively split on whether to apply
Deklewa retroactively. 7 Specifically, the six different circuit decisions have resulted in a draw: three circuits in favor of the retroactive application of Deklewa and three circuits against retroactivity. 88
The following section will discuss retroactivity, in general, the decisions of the various courts of appeals cases for and against the retroactive application of Deklewa, and the similarities of analysis among
the circuits.89
85. See C.E.K. Indus. Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 350 (1st Cir.
1990); United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Mar-Len of Louisiana, 906 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1990);
NLRB v. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1990); Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern
Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 820 F.2d 1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 1987), reh'g granted (withdrawn], 832 F.2d 1164, reh'g granted en bane, 861 F.2d 1124 (1988), remanded, 885 F.2d
594, opinion amended and superseded, 895 F.2d 516 (1989), cert: denied, U.S. -,
111 S. Ct. 209 (1990); NLRB v. W.L. Miller Co., 871 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1989); International
Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 103 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, Deklewa v. NLRB, 488 U.S. 889 (1988).
Several United States District Courts have also dealt with this issue, but their decisions
were not brought to the circuit court level. See, e.g., R.W. Granger & Sons, Inc. v. Eastern
Massachusetts Carpenters Local 275, 686 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1988); National Automatic
Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 731; Construction Indus. Welfare Fund of Rockford v. Jones, 672
F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
86. See C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 357 (delineating which of the circuit courts have or
have not adopted the NLRB's Deklewa holding).
87. See id. at 358 (refusing to apply Deklewa retroactively); Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 20304 (refusing to apply Deklewa retroactively); Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d at 612 (applying Deklewa
retroactively); Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 518-19 (refusing to apply Deklewa retroactively);
W.L. Miller Co., 871 F.2d at 749-50 (applying Deklewa retroactively, except for an interest
award); OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d at 781-82 (applying Deklewa retroactively).
The United States District Courts which have dealt with Deklewa, but whose decisions
were not brought to the circuit court level, have also split on the issue of retroactive application. See, e.g., R.W. Granger & Sons, F. Supp. at 29 (applying Deklewa retroactively); National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 734-35 (refusing to apply Deklewa retroactively);
Construction Indus. Welfare Fund, 672 F. Supp. at 293-94 (refusing to apply Deklewa
retroactively).
88. See supra note 87 (listing the six different courts of appeals and their respective
holdings); see also infra notes 127-377 and accompanying text (detailing the specific findings
of the six different courts of appeals).
89. See infra notes 378-390 and accompanying text (aligning the decisions of the various
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A.

Retroactivity, In General

1. The NLRB's Retroactive Application Of New Policies And
Standards, In General
In determining whether certain NLRB principles should be appoliplied retroactively, it is the Board's usual practice to apply new
9 0 The
cies and standards "to all pending cases in whatever stage."
Board does so under a model formulated by the'Supreme Court in
1
SEC v. Chenery Corp., which requires a reviewing court to
balance:
[S]uch retroactivity ... against the mischief of producing a result
which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable
principles. If that mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroit is not the type of retroactivactive application of a new standard,
92
ity which is condemned by law.

Such a balancing test was applied in Deklewa and led the Board to
conclude that its usual practice of retroactive application for its new
rules was appropriate.9 3
Chenery involved "the question of whether the Securities and
Exchange Commission (hereinafter "SEC") could create legislative
rules by adjudication without utilizing its notice and comment procedures, and whether it could then apply those new rules retroactively."'9 4 In Chenery, the management of Chenery Corporation, a
circuit courts of appeals and discussing the similarities of analysis among the circuits regarding the retroactive application of Deklewa).
90. Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. at 1006-07. In Deluxe Metal Furniture
proCo., the Board established its general "application of new policies and standards" by
the
to
law
of
rule
a
of
pronouncement
each
applying
of
practice
nouncing that "[t]he judicial
and, we
case in which the issue arises and to all pending cases in whatever stage is traditional
believe, the wiser course to follow." Id.
91. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
746
92. Id. at 203; Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 294; NLRB v. Niagara Machine,
727 F.2d
F.2d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 1984); Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB,
1184, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Synalloy Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 637, 638 (1978) (former Member
Penello, dissenting).
93. See Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1389.
Re94. Weaver, Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations: An Analysis of Judicial
InterRegulatory
Retroactive
[hereinafter
(1986)
175
167,
sponses, 61 NOTRE. DAME L. Rav.
L.
pretations]. See generally Weaver, Chenery II: A Forty-Year Retrospective, 40 ADMIN.
Weaver
effects).
continued
its
and
decision
Chenery
the
Rav. 161 (1988) (describing in detail
notes that:
Co.,
The Court confronted the identical problem again in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
416 U.S. 267 (1974). Like Chenery, Bell involved the question of whether precedent
and interpretation of a statute could be applied retroactively. Unlike Chenery, Bell
involved a case of second impression. Prior administrative decisions suggested that
Bell's interpretation was correct. But the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
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public utility holding company, attempted to reorganize and to issue
preferred stock to the company's officers and directors. The SEC was
required to decide whether to approve or reject the company's reorganization plan. The governing act, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, required only that a public utility reorganization
be "fair and equitable to the persons affected thereby," that securi-

ties not be issued on terms "detrimental to the public interest or the
interests of investors," and that the reorganization noL result in the
"unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power." 95 However, the
statute gave little specific guidance. 6 Consequently, the SEC was
forced to apply these general provisions to a previously unaddressed
situation: a reorganization plan issuing preferred stock to a company's officers and directors.9 7 As a result, the SEC rejected the
company's reorganization plan and in the process fashioned a general prohibition against such distributions.98
'The Supreme Court, concluding that the SEC's judgment was
justifiably reached in terms of fairness and equitableness, upheld
both the SEC's decision to create the rule adjudicatively and to apply the new rule retroactively.99 "The Court suggested that although
reversed its prior decisions, and sought to apply its new decision to Bell. The Supreme Court affirmed the NLRB's right to alter its prior precedent, as well as its
right to apply the new precedent retroactively. The Court emphasized that the
NLRB was not seeking to impose either a fine or damages on Bell. Moreover, the
Court noted that the matter was not final because the case had to be remanded for a
final determination about whether Bell had violated the new interpretation. At the
same time, the Court held that, under the facts, "the Board 'is not now free' to read
a new and more restrictive meaning into the Act."
Id. at 175 n.36 (citations omitted).
95. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 204.
96. See id. at 198 (noting that "neither Congress nor the [SEC] had promulgated any
general rule proscribing such action as the purchase of preferred stock" by management). The
Court also pointed out that the "only judge-made rule of equity" in this area related to fraud
or mismanagement of the reorganization by the officers and directors; matters which were
"admittedly absent" in the present case. Id.
97. Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations, supra note 94, at 175-76. The Court
pointed out that the Commission had not previously been confronted with the problem of management trading securities during its company's reorganization. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203.
98. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 204; see id. at 176. Chenery reached the Supreme Court twice.
Originally, the SEC refused to approve the company's reorganization plan on the ground that
the plan was inconsistent with common law principles of equity. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80 (1943). The Court disagreed with the Commission and overturned the SEC's actions.
Id. The Court remanded the case to the Commission for such further proceedings as might be
appropriate. On remand, the SEC reexamined the problem and reached the same result. However, this time, the SEC premised its disapproval of the company's plan on the governing
statute, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and the Court upheld the SEC's
order. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
99. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 209; RetroactiveRegulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at
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it is generally preferable for an agency to create rules in advance,

using its notice and comment procedures, an agency could create ad-

judicative rules."100 However, the Court held that, to the extent that

the latter rules had a retroactive effect, they had to be subjected to

the balancing test.' 0 ' Employing this test, the Court concluded that
the regulatory interest in applying the interpretation retroactively
outweighed the ill effect and approved the retroactive application of
the new rules.'0 2
Since 1947, the retroactivity test in Chenery has been applied

03
exclusively to administrative agency adjudications' -the same conarisen. 0 4
text in which Deklewa and all other NLRB decisions have
In addition, "lower federal courts have extended Chenery to interpretations of regulations.' 0 5 "This extension was appropriate beinterpretations are initially announced
cause many [administrative]
10 6
1
precedent.'
in the form of

2. Retroactivity Analysis in the Federal Courts:
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huron

Even though it is the NLRB's usual practice to apply new policies and standards to all cases no matter what stage in the litigation
they have reached, 10 7 the federal courts are not specifically bound by
0
the Board's views on retroactive application.1 Courts have the
176.

100. Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 176; see Chenery, 332
U.S. at 201-05.
101. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203.
102. Id.
103. See OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d at 780 n.12.
104. See, e.g., E.L. Weigand Div. v. NLRB, 650 F.2d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting
that the Chenery retroactivity test must be applied to newly adopted administrative rules and
interpretations, including those of the NLRB).
105. Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 176 & n.43 (listing various cases). These lower federal courts review agency adjudicative rules to insure that they do
not have an unreasonable retroactive impact. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. United States Dep't of
Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 175 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190
(1983); Runnells v. Andrus, 484 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (D. Utah. 1980); Ruangswang v. INS,
591 F.2d 39, 45-46 (9th Cir. 1978); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States Dep't of Energy,
449 F. Supp. 760, 797 (D. Del.), affd sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. United States Dep't of
Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978). See generally Chenery II: A Forty-Year
Retrospective, supra note 94, at 194 n.134 (discussing lower court cases which have reviewed
adjudicative rules and interpretations).
106. Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 176.
107. See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
108. Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 780 (citing NLRB v. Semco Printing
Center, Inc., 721 F.2d 886, 892 (2d Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., NLRB v. Chicago Marine Containers, Inc., 745 F.2d 493, 499 (7th Cir. 1984) (pointing out that the court is "not bound by the
Board's views on retroactive application"); cf. Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of Richmond,
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power to independently interpret administrative rules and regulations. 10 1 However, courts generally defer to an administrative
agency's application of a newly adopted rule unless "manifest injus110
tice" would result.
416 U.S. 696, 711-12 n.15 (1974); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308
U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
It is well established that the federal courts have the power to decide against retroactivity.
Mr. Justice Cardozo was among the first to establish this right. See Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). In Great Northern, Cardozo established
that a court may choose between two alternatives when new laws are created. A court may
apply the new rule retroactively, that is "hold to the ancient dogma that the law declared...
had a Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration, in which event the discredited
declaration will be viewed as if it had never been, and the reconsidered declaration as law from
the beginning." Id. at 365. Alternatively, a court may apply the new ruling prospectively, thus
avoiding undue hardship to parties who have relied on the old law. In either case, it was
Cardozo's belief that the choice was the court's, as "the federal constitution has no voice upon
the subject." Id. at 364. See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965) (holding that
"the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect.").
109. See Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 182.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's landmark opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 368, 388-89 (1803), originally established that it is peculiarly the "province and duty
of the courts to say what the law is." See also Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 193 (1969); Trust
of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 671-72 (1945); First Nat'l Bank in Sioux Falls v.
National Bank of S.D., 667 F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir. 1981). Additionally, the judicial review
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act compel a reviewing court to "decide all relevant questions of law." Administrative Procedure Act § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988) (discussing scope of review).
110. Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974). In
Bradley, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the
time it renders its decision, unless such application would work a "manifest injustice" or there
is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary; even where the intervening law does
not explicitly recite that it is to be applied to pending cases, it is to be given recognition and
effect. Id.
The origin and the justification for this rule are found in the words of Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall in United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801):
It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to enquire
whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if subsequent to the
judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation
denied. If the law be constitutional . . . I know of no court which can contest its
obligation. It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and
ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns ...the court must
decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment,
rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation of law, the
judgment must be set aside.
Id.
Although courts have the authority to independently determine an administrative rule or
regulation's meaning, they frequently defer to agency interpretations. See Retroactive Regula'tory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 182 n.70 (quoting United States Senator Dale Bumpers's statement that judicial deference to agency interpretations has been "elevated to a virtual
presumption of correctness" in some courts); see, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444
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The Supreme Court has not thoroughly clarified whether judi11
cial deference is required on retroactivity issues. ' The lower federal
U.S. 555, 568 (1980); Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Walton League of Am., Inc., 423 U.S.
12 (1975). In general, "the courts do so in an undisciplined manner, making it difficult to
predict when deference will be given, or what the level of deference will be." Retroactive
Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 172 n.17; see Weaver, Judicial Interpretationof
Administrative Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. PiT. L. REV. 587, 590-600 (1984).
However, many commentators have argued that courts apply the deference rule in a resultoriented manner, making independent judicial interpretations and then giving deference only
when it is convenient. See Gellhom & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 771, 780-81 (1975); Landis, A Note on "StatutoryInterpretation," 43 HARV.
L. REv. 890 (1930); Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 3 n.18 (1983); Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 294
(1986); Weaver, Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 182 n.70; Weaver,
The Deference Rule, supra, at 590-91; Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial
Review of Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REv. 329, 335 (1979); see also K. DAvis, ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 7.13 (2d ed. 1979); Note, Judicial Review of Regulations and Rulings Under the Revenue Acts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (1939) (authored by The Harvard
Lav Review Association). Even Mr. Justice Holmes once remarked with reference to the problem of retroactivity that "perhaps the reasoning of the cases has not always been as sound as
the instinct which directed the decisions." Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 59 N.E. 1033, 1034
(Mass. 1901). Ninety years ago, Holmes suggested that the criteria which really governed
decisions are "the prevailing views of justice." Id.
Additionally, several areas of administrative regulation have developed their own body of
case law and authority regarding judicial deference. See Kennedy, Judicial Review of Commerce Department Antidumping Duty Determinations: Deference or Abdication?, 11 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 19, 20-22 (1986); Levin, FederalScope-of-Review Standards: A Preliminary Restatement, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 97 (1985) (stating that "[e]very substantive
field of regulation develops its own body of case law articulating the degree of deference to be
afforded to various administrative determinations in that area."; see, e.g., Boudreau, To Defer
or Not to Defer: The Question for the D.C. Circuit in Reviewing FCC Decisions, 36 FED.
CoM. L.J. 193 (1984) (using the FCC as an example of administrative regulation and review
of agency decision-making). See generally, The Deference Rule, supra (discussing deference
to administrative regulations in general).
111. Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 216.
Weaver points out that "the Supreme Court's rhetoric on the subject is frequently inconsistent with its actions." Id. at 216 n.222. Typically, the Supreme Court entirely ignores the
deference rule except when it suits them. For instance, in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin,
444 U.S. 555 (1980), the Court gave deference to the Federal Reserve Board and stressed that
courts should generally honor administrative interpretations. See FordMotor Credit Co., 444
U.S. at 566, 568 (stating that a "court that tries to chart a true course to the Act's purpose
embarks upon a voyage without a compass when it disregards the agency's views."). However,
in the following term, the Court firmly rejected an administrative interpretation without any
discussion of the deference rule. See United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981). Weaver
has also noted that at times, "the Court can forget this important presumption even though it
is pointed out by a fellow Justice." Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at
216 n.222; see Swank, 451 U.S. at 589 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the IRS's "interpretation of its own regulation [wa]s entitled to deference."); see also AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 712 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the
plurality completely disregarded the principle of deference). Regardless, the Court has held
that if the appropriate agency has not ruled on the retroactivity question presented before a
court, the case should be remanded to allow the respective agency to do so. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Food Store Employees Union, Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 10 n.10 (1974) (holding that a "court
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courts have taken inconsistent positions. A number of these courts
have held that deference is required,"" while others have held that it
is not. 113 As a result, in deciding whether a new NLRB ruling, such
as Deklewa, is not to be applied to a certain case, the federal courts
often look to the factors set out in Chevron v. Huron,11 4 as relevant
to the question of nonretroactivity.
In Chevron, the claimant commenced an action for personal injuries sustained on a drilling rig off the Louisiana coast two years
earlier.115 At the time of filing, the Fifth Circuit had applied admiralty law to such actions, limited only by the laches doctrine. 1 During pre-trial discovery, the United States Supreme Court decided
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,117 which held that

off-shore personal injury cases were governed by the state statute of

reviewing an agency decision following an intervening change of policy by the agency should
remand to permit the agency to decide in the first instance whether giving the change retrospective effect will best effectuate the policies underlying the agency's governing act."); see
also Blackman-Uhler Chem. Div., Synalloy Corp. v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 1118, 1119 (4th Cir.
1977) (remanding the case to the agency for it to determine whether the precedent should be
retroactively applied); Corr,Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied,"
61 N.C.L. Rav. 745, 785 (1983).
112. See, e.g., Certainteed Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 1042, 1056 (11th Cir. 1983) (concluding that "[b]arring some extraordinary circumstance, this court will not disturb th6 purely
administrative determination that giving retrospective or prospective effect to a policy change
best effectuates the purposes of its governing act."); see also NLRB v. Chicago Marine Containers, Inc., 745 F.2d 493, 498 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that "[i]n
deciding whether to follow
an intervening change of policy by.an administrative agency .... it is appropriate to allow the
agency to decide in first instance whether giving change retroactive effect will best effectuate
policies underlying the agency's governing act."); Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,
supra note 94, at 217.
113. See Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (stating that "[w]hich side of [the Chenery balancing test] preponderates is in each
case a question of law, resolvable by reviewing courts with no overriding obligation of deference to the agency decision."); Lodge 743 & 1736, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 452 n.48 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that
"[w]hether to give retroactive effect to administrative rules promulgated in agency adjudication is a question of law, and reviewing courts are not obligated to grant any deference to the
agency decision."); White v. Califano, 473 F. Supp. 503, 506 (S.D. W.Va. 1979) (holding that
"[t]he decision whether to grant or deny retroactive force to newly adopted administrative
rules is purely a question of law and as such a reviewing court is under no overriding obligation of deference to the agency decision."); see also Pennzoil Co. v. United States Dep't of
Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 173 (Temp. Emer. Ct.,App. 1982) (stating that "the rule of deference
will not sustain the retroactive application of an interpretation of which an affected interest
had no fair notice."); Daughters of Miiam Center for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250,
1258-59 (3d Cir. 1978) (refusing to defer to the agency's decision to apply a new legislative
rule retroactively); Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 217.
114. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
115. Id. at 98.
116. Id. at 99.
117. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
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118 Accordlimitations provided in the law of the contiguous state.
ingly, the district court dismissed the case, citing the Louisiana time
bar of one year. 1 9 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, reaffirming
2 0 Finally, the Supreme
the applicability of the laches doctrine.'
Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit ruling as to the claimant at bar, and
2
remanded the case to the trial court. ' Simultaneously, however, the
Court revised the finding of the Fifth Circuit with regard to the applicable time bar, 2 2 and reaffirmed its decision in Rodrigue that the
2
state statute of limitations was to be used.'

Nonetheless, the Court

proclaimed that Rodrigue was not to have retroactive application to
the case at bar, thus allowing the claimant, whose case was pending
24
at the time of the decision, to rely on the prior law.
In forging this decision against retroactive application, the
Court articulated three criteria applicable to retroactivity analysis.
The court enunciated the factors to be used in determining whether
a law-altering decision should be given prospective, rather than retroactive, effect as: (1) whether the decision to be applied retroactively establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling clear
precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue
of first impression; (2) the effect of retroactivity on accomplishing
the purpose of the law; and (3) the inequity imposed by retroactive
application. 125 Over the past twenty years, these three factors have
118. Id. at 355. The Court held that the Lands Act required that a State's statute of
limitations be applied to actions for personal injuries occurring on fixed structures on the
Outer Continental Shelf. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 99-100.
119. See Chevron, 404 U.S. at 99. The District Court did not publish an opinion. Id. at
99 n.2.
120. Huson v. Otis Eng'g. Corp., 430 F.2d 27, 32 (5th Cir. 1970).
121. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 109.
122. Id. at 101-05.
123. Id. at 103.
124. Id. at 107-08. The Court held that the Louisiana one-year statute of limitations at
issue should not bar the claimant's action since retroactive application of that statute would
deprive him of any remedy on the basis of an unforeseeable superseding legal doctrine in
another case. Id. The Court pointed out that the retroactive application of the new Rodrigue
rule would undermine its purpose, "which was to aid injured employees by providing comprehensive and familiar remedies." Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that retroactivity in this
case would "produce the most 'substantial and inequitable results' . . . to hold that the respondent 'slept on his rights' at the time when he could not have known the time limitation that the
law imposed upon him." Id. at 108 (citation omitted).
125. Id. at 106-07. Chevron specifically provides, in pertinent part, that:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of
law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied...
or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed .... Second, it has been stressed that "we must weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation."
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remained necessary considerations for federal courts in their deter-

mination of nonretroactivity. 28
B.

Cases In Support of Retroactivity

Three of the six United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the Deklewa retroactivity issue have applied the NLRB's
new rules retroactively.1 27 These three circuit courts concluded that
retroactivity would work no "manifest injustice" on the construction
industry employers involved because, at the time that the respective
employers had repudiated their prehire agreements, the unions had
already achieved majority status. 128 Therefore, even under preDeklewa law, the employers would have been precluded from lawfully repudiating the agreements. 29 The following Third, Eighth and
Seventh Circuit decisions supported the retroactive application of
Deklewa.
1.

The Enforcement of Deklewa: InternationalAssociation of

Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
Local 3 v. NLRB

In

June

1960,

John

Deklewa

s0

&

Sons

(hereinafter

...Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for
"[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results
if
applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or
hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity."
Id. (citations omitted).
126. See, e.g., Mesa Verde, 885 F.2d at 596 (stating that retroactivity analysis is governed by Chevron); Chicago Marine Containers, 745 F.2d at 499 (looking to the Chevron
factors to determine whether any manifest injustice would result from the retroactive application of an NLRB rule).
The federal courts are nearly uniform in their use of the Chevron standard. See, e.g.,
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 175 n.2 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-88
(1982); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 550 n.12 (1982); Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia
Co., 720 F.2d 1247, 1249-50 (1 lth Cir. 1983); Edwards v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 720 F.2d 857,
859-60 (5th Cir. 1983); Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th
Cir. 1983); Perez v. Dana Corp., 718 F.2d 581, 584-85 (3d Cir. 1983); Franklin Mint v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303, 311-12 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 462 U.S. 1118
(1983); NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 757 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 894 (1981); Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir. 1980).
127. See NLRB v. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1990); NLRB v. W.L.
Miller Co., 871 F.2d 745, 749-50 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Deklewa retroactively, except for
an interest award);OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d 771, 781-82 (3d Cir. 1988).
128. See id.; United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Mar-Len of Louisiana, 906 F.2d 200, 204 n.4
(5th Cir. 1990)
129. See Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 204 n.4.
130. 843 F.2d 770, (3d Cir. 1988), enforcing, John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B.
1375, 1389 (1987), cert. denied, Deklewa v. NLRB, 488 U.S. 889 (1988).
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"Deklewa"),1 3 1 although not a member of the Ironworker Employers
Association of Western Pennsylvania (hereinafter "Association"),
entered into and consented to be bound by a prehire agreement between the Association and the Ironworkers Union (hereinafter
"Union").1 32 Deklewa adhered to all successive agreements between
In October 1980,
the Association and the Union for twenty years."'
134
Association.
the
of
member
a
Deklewa became
Deklewa engaged in a number of projects which required ironworkers to be employed.' 35 When Deklewa performed the work itself, it hired ironworkers through the union hiring hall. l"6 When
Deklewa required subcontractors, it subcontracted its work only to
companies bound by the same union prehire agreement. 3 7 In September 1983, during the term of a prehire agreement covering the
years 1982 to 1985, Deklewa terminated its membership with the
Association and notified the Union that it was repudiating the current agreement. 38 Subsequently, Deklewa subcontracted further iron
work to an employer who was not a party to the Association-Union
agreement.'13 As a result, the Union filed an unfair labor practice
charge against Deklewa on October 14, 1983.140

The NLRB, in a ruling which reversed its prior construction of
the NLRA, held that Deklewa had violated section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA by unilaterally repudiating the. 1982-85 agreement, but that
Deklewa "was not obligated to bargain with the Union" after the
expiration of the agreement in 1985.1'1 The Board also held that its
131.

Deklewa was engaged as an employer in the construction business. Ornamental

Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 771.
132.

Id. The Ironworkers Union involved in this case was the Local 3 of the Interna-

tional Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers. Id.
133.

Id. at 771. The twenty year period ran from June 24, 1960 to October 1, 1980. Id.

at 771-72.
134. Id. at 772.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.; see Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987).
The Third Circuit briefly summarized the background of the case, in pertinent part, as
follows:
In the instant case, the employer, Deklewa, unilaterally repudiated its prehire

agreement with the Union. The Union then filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board, asserting that Deklewa was not free to repudiate its agreement. The

Union's unfair labor practice charge against. Deklewa became the vehicle for the
Board's reconsideration of the R.J.Smith rule. The Board ultimately concluded that
the R.J. Smith rule had proved inadequate, and that in practice the rule served to
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decision would apply to all cases then pending, as well as all future
142
cases.
The NLRB ordered Deklewa to make whole any employees that
may have suffered losses as a result of Deklewa's repudiation and
resulting failure to adhere to the prehire agreement until the agreement had expired in 1985.143 However, the Board declined to extend
this remedy beyond the expiration of the agreement. 144 Thus,
Deklewa was not held liable for any financial losses which the Union
may have sustained after the prehire agreement's expiration date. 145
"Not surprisingly, both Deklewa and the Union challenged this deci146
sion and . . .petitioned for review."'

In International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 147 the Third Circuit upheld
the NLRB's holding in Deklewa, including its revised interpretation
of prehire provisions under the NLRA, not permitting employers to
unilaterally repudiate prehire agreements with unions. 48 Additionally, the court upheld the Board's decision to retroactively apply its
revised interpretation, since doing so was not manifestly unjust. 40
Accordingly, both Deklewa's and the Union's petitions for review
were denied and the Board's cross-application for enforcement was
50
granted.1
In addressing the retroactive application of Deklewa, the Third
Circuit recognized that the Second Circuit previously had held that
defeat the very interests that the [NLRA] and 8(f) were designed to protect.

The Board then fashioned a new interpretation of 8(f) which sought to accommodate both employers' and employees' interests ..

.

. The Board in its present

order, abandoned the "conversion doctrine," and held that 8(f) prehire agreements
were only enforceable during the term of the agreement and could not be converted

into traditional collective bargaining agreements with lingering rights and obligations absent an election and certification.
Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 775.

142. Id. at 772. The NLRB's decision was based on a detailed examination of both the
legislative history of the NLRA and, in particular, section 8(f). Id.
143. Id. at 775.
144.

Id.

145. Id.
146. Id. In petitioning for review of the NLRB's order, Deklewa and the Union challenged different features of the Board's ruling. Id. at 771. Deklewa disputed the Board's finding that prehire agreements were not unilaterally voidable. Id. The Union argued that the
Board erred in holding that an employer's duty to bargain with the respective union terminates
upon the expiration date of the prehire agreement. Id.
147. 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988), enforcing, John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375
(1987), cert. denied, Deklewa v. NLRB, 488 U.S. 889 (1988).

148. Id. at 781-82.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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while it was "of course not bound by the Board's views on retroactive

application, [it] should defer to them absent some manifest injus-

tice." 1' 5 The Third Circuit supported this standard and reiterated its

view that in matters involving interpretation of the NLRA, the

1 52
The court stated that "a decision to
Board is entitled to deference.

hold a new rule retroactive is not strictly a question of statutory interpretation."' 53 Nevertheless, the court was persuaded that when

the "Board changes a [previously established] rule and makes it ret-

roactive, particularly when the Board assigns as its reasons for doing

so the furtherance of the fundamental statutory policies of employee

free choice and labor relations stability, the Board should be entitled'
to exercise its broadest power.'1

54

Hence, unless the Board's retroac-

the court contive application would result in "manifest injustice,"
55
order.'
Board's
the
cluded that it would uphold
In reviewing the Board's holding in Deklewa, the Third Circuit
pointed out many of the Board's actions in arriving at its new section
8(f) principles. For instance, the Board recognized and identified
each interest of the parties and related all of the interests involved to
the purposes of the NLRA.5 6 The Board also considered the
NLRA's policies of employee free choice and labor relations stability, and it examined the potential problems that would result if it
applied the now disclaimed R.J. Smith rule to pending section 8(f)
cases. 57 Additionally, "[tihe Board, employing the retroactivity
151. Id. at 780 (quoting NLRB v. Semco Printing Center, Inc., 721 F.2d 886, 892 (2d
Cir. 1983)).
152. Id.; see, e.g., E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co. (Chestnut Run) v. NLRB, 733 F.2d
296, 297 (3d Cir. 1984).
In Ornamental Iron Workers, the Third Circuit noted that the result it reached, would
have been the same had it adopted the abuse of discretion standard, as proposed by Deklewa,
the Union, and the amicus. 843 F.2d at 780 n.12. The court stated that "[iun light of the
Board's analysis and reasoning, [it would have been] hard-pressed to hold that the Board's
retroactivity decision was not an appropriate exercise of its discretion." Id.
Additionally, the court pointed out that their result would have been no different if it
engaged in an independent analysis under either Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947) or Chevron,
404 U.S. 97 (1971). Id. The analysis of Chenery is substantively no different than the three
factor analysis of Chevron. See id. "Chenery, however, has been applied exclusively to administrative agency adjudications, the same context in which this case has arisen." Id. Chevron on
the other hand, "appears to have been applied exclusively to judicial adjudications." Id. at 780
n.12. As noted in the case, however, an independent analysis (based on the record) under
either test would have reached the same result in the case. Id.
153. OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d at 780 (citing Mosey Manufacturing Co., Inc.
v. NLRB, 701 F.2d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 1983)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 781.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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analysis of SEC v. Chenery, balanced the claimed ill effects of retroactivity against the 'mischief of producing a result which is contrary
to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles,' "as5 and

concluded that:
[t]he statutory benefits from the announced changes in 8(f) law for
employees, employers and unions in the construction industry far
outweigh any hardships resulting from immediate imposition of
those changes. Consequently, we will apply the Board's new 8(f)
principles to this case and to all pending cases in whatever stage.25 9
As a result, the Third Circuit could not perceive any "manifest
injustice," indicating that it should not defer to the Board's reasoning on the retroactivity issue.16 The court, agreeing with the Board,
believed that a construction industry employer, such as Deklewa,
who relied on the R.J. Smith rule did so at its own risk, since under
the conversion doctrine, once the respective union achieved majority
status, conversion would occur and the section 8(0 agreement would
be automatically binding on the employer. 161 Hence, the court found
that the particular facts of Deklewa aptly demonstrated this
possibility."62
For instance, in 1980, Deklewa became a member of the Association, an organization composed of approximately thirty-five construction industry employers. 6 3 In so doing, pursuant to the "merger
doctrine,' 64 the relevant unit of employees for determining the majority status of the Union became all employees who were hired
under the Association's agreement with the Union, rather than those
employees specifically employed by Deklewa.165 And, since the stipulated record submitted by the parties indicated that the multi-employer unit of employees obtained majority status, it appeared entirely likely that, even under the old R.J. Smith rule, the Board
158. Id. (quoting Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203) (citations omitted).
159. Id. (quoting Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1389).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. The NLRB first established the "merger doctrine" in Amado Electric, 238
N.L.R.B. 37 (1978); and Authorized Air Conditioning Company, 236 N.L.R.B. 131 (1978),
enforced on other grounds, 606 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
The essence of the rule held that: "when a single employer joins a multiemployer association
and adopts that association's collective-bargaining agreement, the single employer's unit
'merges' into the multiemployer unit and the requisite inquiry into majority support occurs in
that multiemployer unit." Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1379 & n.14; see Amado Electric, 238
N.L.R.B. at 37 n.1; Authorized Air Conditioning Company, 236 N.L.R.B. at 131 n.2.
165. OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d at 781.
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would have held that Deklewa was not free to repudiate its agree-

ment with the Union. 166 The court pointed out that in applying the

Board's new interpretation of section 8(f) to Deklewa's case, the
Board had done nothing more than "hold Deklewa and the Union to

the terms and conditions of the [section] 8(f) contract into which
they voluntarily entered."' 67 Accordingly, finding no manifest injustice present, the Third Circuit upheld the retroactive application of

the Board's new interpretations of section 8(f) prehire provisions dnnounced in Deklewa and granted the NLRB's cross-application for
enforcement.168
2. NLRB v. W.L. Miller Companyl6 "

In 1972, W.L. Miller Company (hereinafter "Miller") began
performing work in Missouri, but did not establish a continuing bargaining relationship with any union.17 0 Seven years later, Miller
joined the Associated General Contractors of Missouri (hereinafter
"Association"), but declined to adopt the prehire agreements previously negotiated by the Association.

7

-1

In February 1980, the Associ-

ation informed its members that the terms of the previous prehire
agreements were to expire the end of April and that a committee

was being formed to negotiate new agreements. 72 "The Association
distributed designation of representative forms, which when signed

by a member gave the committee the power to bind that member to

the labor agreement.'

173

On February 8, Miller's president signed

the form,' but specifically instructed the company's office manager
166. Id. "Among the factors which appeared in the record were: (1) a union security
clause in the agreement between the Association and the. Union; (2) actual union membership
of a majority of the employees; and (3) all job referrals came from the Union's hiring hall."
Id. at 781 n.14 (citations omitted).
167. Id. at 781. The Board, with these considerations in mind, "held Deklewa and all
pending cases, subject to the new [section] 8(f) principles now adopted." Id.
168. Id. at 781-82.
169. 871 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1989).
170. Id. at 746. Miller was a general construction contractor. Id. Its employees did not
designate or select the Eastern Missouri Laborers Council [hereinafter the "Union"] or any
other labor organization as their representative. Id.
171. Id. The Eastern Missouri Laborers Council was'the Union signatory to the labor
agreements in dispute. Id.
Prior to 1980, the Association's individual members were not legally bound by these
agreements. Id. Instead, the members determined individually whether accepting the prehire
agreements was in their own best interests. Id. Additionally, "no provision in the association
bylaws bound a member to any labor agreement." Id. Miller originally notified the Association's manager "that it had previously operated on an open shop basis in Missouri, and desired
to continue in this manner." Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. This type of form had not been used previously by the Association. Id.
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not to mail the signed form without first verifying that the form
would not legally obligate Miller in any way. 17 4 Miller's office manager did not follow these instructions and mailed the form to the
Association. 17 5 By May 6, a tentative labor agreement was reached
and the Association notified all of its members of a meeting where
the final binding vote would take place. 176 A contract was approved
at that meeting, and a bulletin was forwarded to all of its members
informing them that a binding contract extending from May 1, 1980
77
through April 30, 1983 had been executed.1
While the Eastern Missouri Laborers Council (hereinafter
"Union") immediately began trying to persuade Miller to abide by
the terms of the contract, on July 23, Miller informed the Union
that it believed the contract to be a section 8(f) agreement, that the
majority of Miller employees were not Union members, and that this
gave Miller a unilateral right to repudiate.178 Miller then terminated
the agreement, and the Union promptly responded by filing an unfair
labor practice complaint with the NLRB. 7 9
In an administrative hearing, the Administrative Law Judge
(hereinafter "AL") rejected Miller's claim that it was not a party
to the contract and found that "Miller and the seventy-nine other
signatories had unequivocally intended to be bound as a group, and
that therefore, a valid multi-employer bargaining unit had been established." 80 The ALJ further concluded that, even though Miller's
employees were not themselves Union members, the Union enjoyed
majority status in the multi-employer unit as a whole.'' Consequently, the ALJ found Miller to be in violation of sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, and ordered Miller to sign and implement the 1980-83 contract, apply its terms retroactively to May 1,
1980, and recognize and bargain with the Union as the sole legitimate representative of his workers."' 82
174. Id. at 747.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177.

Id.

178. Id.
179. Id.

180. Id.
181.

Id. As a consequence of the AL's finding, a full collective bargaining relationship

was established between the multi-employer unit and the Union. Id. Under section 9(a) of the
NLRA, this imposed a continuing legal obligation on the two parties to bargain with each
other. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. 159(a) (1988). "Miller's employees were in effect merged with the

employees of the other signatories, with the resultant conversion from a section 8(f) relationship to a section 9(a) relationship." 871 F.2d at 747.
182. W.L. Miller, 871 F.2d at 747. The ALJ issued its order on August 19, 1981. Id.
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As a result, Miller filed exceptions with the Board on Septem-

ber 8, 1981, and both parties submitted briefs to the Board. 8' A

decision was not issued until July 23, 1987, almost six years after the
ALJ's original order.' Earlier in 1987, in Deklewa, the NLRB
abandoned the conversion doctrine that the ALJ had relied on in

making his findings. 185 Instead, the Board had held that a section
8(f) agreement may not be unilaterally repudiated during its term,

and that the union subject to the agreement acquires a limited section 9(a) representative status only during the agreement's term. 8 6
Consequently, the Board abandoned the ALJ's conversion approach
in favor of its new Deklewa rule. 187 Utilizing its new rule, the Board
found "Miller fully liable for the 1980-83 contract, but also found no
presumption of Union majority status following the expiration of
that contract."

88

Accordingly, the Board concluded that Miller had

violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) "only during the life of the
1980-83 contract, and ordered only damages for breach of that con-

tract, along with the interest on any amount due."'819 The NLRB

then filed a petition seeking to enforce an order against Miller for
violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5); both Miller and the Union
petitioned for review. 190
In NLRB v. W.L. Miller Company,'9 ' the Eighth Circuit de-

clined the invitations of both parties to reexamine the Deklewa
rule, 192 and held that it should be applied retroactively. 193 However,
183.
184.

Id.
Id.

185. Id.; see Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377 (overruling the Board's early decision in
R.J. Smith and abandoning the "so-called conversion doctrine"). The Eighth Circuit pointed
out that the conversion doctrine "held section 8(f) agreements to be fully enforceable only if
the Union enjoyed majority status in the appropriate unit of workers .... " 871 F.2d at 747.
186. W.L. Miller, 871 F.2d at 747.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. "The alleged violations involve[d] Miller's repudiation of a labor agreement
validly accepted by the Associated General Contractors of Missouri, a multiemployer bargaining unit to which Miller belonged, and Miller's subsequent refusal to bargain with the Eastern
Missouri Laborers Council, the Union signatory to the agreement." Id. at 746. Miller originally contended that the contract in dispute was simply a section 8(f) prehire agreement
which, under R.J. Smith, it could unilaterally repudiate at any time. See id. However, the
Board rejected this view, and instead retroactively applied its new anti-repudiation rule announced in Deklewa. Id. Miller further argued both that the Board erroneously construed
section 8(f) in Deklewa, and that, in any event, Deklewa should not be applied retroactively.
Id. "The Union intervene[d], arguing that the limitation of responsibility to the period of the
contract was improper." Id.
191. 871 F.2d 745, 746 (8th Cir. 1989).
192. Id. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court had not definitively re-
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the court believed that holding Miller fully responsible for the interest required by the Board's order would result in manifest injustice
and modified the order in this respect.194 The court otherwise
granted enforcement of the NLRB's order.1 95
In addressing whether Deklewa should be applied retroactively,
the Eighth Circuit noted that although other circuits had split over

which standard of review to apply to administrative retroactivity decisions, 196 it believed that the issue had already been settled by the
court in NLRB v. Monark Boat Company.19 In Monark, the court

had previously determined that it was required to apply the law as it
stood at the time of its decision, particularly when the Board had
explicitly stated that it should be applied retroactively. 19 8 The only
exception to this rule "occurs when the result would be manifestly
unjust." 1 9 9

Miller advanced two arguments supporting the proposition that
retroactive application of Deklewa would be manifestly unjust.
"First, Miller argued that the repudiation in question was permitted
by law at the time it was made."20 0 This argument lead the court to
solved this issue, and therefore, the Board was "free to change its interpretation to be more
consistent with the objectives of the statute." Id. at 748 (referring to Ornamental Iron Workers, in which the Third Circuit's extensively quoted from the NLRB's Deklewa opinion to
"demonstrate the careful thought and planning behind the new rule").
193. Id. at 746.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 748. The Eighth Circuit pointed out that "[s]everal circuits give deference
absent a showing of manifest injustice." Id. at 748 n.2 (citing Ornamental Iron Workers, 843
F.2d at 789-81, NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home, Inc., 720 F.2d 726, 729 (Ist Cir.
1983), and NLRB v. Semco Printing Center, Inc., 721 F.2d 886, 892 (2d Cir. 1983)). On the
other hand, the court noted that some courts "have given little deference to Board decisions
concerning retroactivity." Id. (citing Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466
F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972), which used its own independent analysis)). The Eighth Circuit believed that Congress had given the NLRB great discretion in interpreting "all aspects of
statutory labor policy, justifying a deferential review." Id. (citing Ornamental Iron Workers,
843 F.2d at 780).
197. 713 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1983).
198. W.L. Miller, 871 F.2d at 748; see Monark Boat Company, 713 F.2d at 361.
199. Id.
200. W.L. Miller, 871 F.2d at 748-49. The court considered this to be a powerful argument. Id. (noting that this argument had been used by other courts to avoid retroactive application of Deklewa). However, the Eighth Circuit pointed out that other courts had discarded
this argument, "reasoning that the old conversion rule, which upheld section 8(f) agreements
only when the Union signatory enjoyed majority status, was so unpredictable that no company
could reasonably rely on being able to repudiate section 8(f) agreements." Id. at 749; see, e.g.,
Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 781 (stating that an employer "who relied on the R.J.
Smith rule did so at its own risk, because once conversion occurred, the 8(f) agreement would
be automatically binding); R.W. Granger & Sons, Inc. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 686 F. Supp. 22, 29-30 (D. Mass. 1988) (noting that the employer's repudiation in reli-
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examine whether the respective prehire agreement would have been

enforceable under the old conversion rule.2"' The court was satisfied

that, in the present case, conversion had already taken place when

Miller tried to repudiate since: (1) the ALJ explicitly found the
Union to have enjoyed majority status in the multi-employer unit

which Miller had voluntarily joined; and (2) the court did not find
this determination to be clearly erroneous.202 "Thus, Miller was already bound to an enforceable contract under the old conversion rule
when it tried to repudiate. ' 20 3 The court also pointed out that the
retroactive application of the Deklewa rule would benefit Miller
since, under this rule, Miller would be relieved of any continuing
obligation to bargain with the Union that otherwise would have been
enforced.20 4 Thus, the court concluded that "Miller's reliance on the
ance on R.J. Smith was not without substantial risk since the union may have obtained majority status at that time). However, the court was reluctant to issue a strict holding that a
construction industry employer "could never have reasonably relied on its ability to repudiate a
section 8(f) agreement." 871 F.2d at 749.
The Eighth Circuit was careful to point out that "[t]here were obviously some situations
where a Union signatory did not enjoy anything close to majority status, and the possibility of
conversion was therefore remote." Id. The court discussed both sides of this issue as follows:
When two parties negotiate at arm's length, both aware that the law currently permits repudiation of any contract they make unless certain events occur, the
probability of those events happening will influence the terms of the contract. Applying Deklewa to a situation such as this would "undermine the prior contract
between the parties," and create a windfall for the union by holding the employer to
terms that would never have been agreed upon if the Deklewa rule were anticipated.
On the other hand, the right to repudiate had, over the years, been substantially
limited by case law, and frequently could only be determined through complex and
lengthy litigation probing whether the union had acquired majority support in the
appropriate bargaining unit, which in turn involved issues of "permanent and stable" or "project by project" work force and whether a multi-employer bargaining
unit existed. Such issues are, moreover, difficult to litigate when they deal with
events long past.
Id. (citations omitted). But see Construction Indus. Welfare Fund v. Jones, 672 F. Supp. 291,
294 (N.D. Il. 1987) (holding that retroactive application of Deklewa would clearly undermine
prehire contract between parties since "the right to repudiate a section 8(f) agreement is
surely a key factor upon which parties rely in entering new contracts and modifying existing
ones.").
201. W.L. Miller, 871 F.2d at 749.
202. Id. In Amado Electric,238 N.L.R.B. 37 (1978), and Authorized Air Conditioning
Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 131 (1978), enforced on other grounds, 606 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980), the NLRB established its general rules regarding multi-employer
agreements and the "merger doctrine." In W.L. Miller, the Eighth Circuit recognized that,
under these cases, "the appropriate unit for measuring Union majority status is not the employees of one separate company, but the employees of all the employer signatories to the
contract." 871 F.2d at 749 (citing Authorized Air Conditioning, 236 N.L.R.B. at 134).
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
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former law did not create manifest injustice in this case.

' 20 5

Second, Miller contended that the long delay of the Board in

adjudicating the case resulted in manifest injustice.2 11 In oral argu-

ment, both Miller and the Union clearly established that the active
issue before the Eighth Circuit was not "underpayment of the employees, but rather Miller's failure to make contributions to the
Union's benefit fund.

' 207

While the court decisively found that the

retroactive application of Deklewa rendered Miller liable for the unpaid fund contributions, "[t]he interest, however, raised additional
concerns." 208a On July 23, 1980, Miller repudiated the contract which
was to run from May 1, 1980 to April 30, 1983.209 However, the
Deklewa rule arose at a substantially later time. 210 Since the sole
issue before the court involved payment into the Union's benefit
fund, and the ALJ found that none of Miller's employees were ever
members of the Union, the court concluded that it was "manifestly
unjust to award interest for the entire period.

'211

Hence, with the

exception of the interest assessed against Miller, the Eighth Circuit,
absent a showing of manifest injustice, deferred to the NLRB's decision to apply its new Deklewa rule retroactively. 212
213
3. NLRB v. Bufco Corporation

In 1973, the Corbett Electric Company (hereinafter "Corbett")
signed two Letters of Assent authorizing the National Electrical
Contractors Association (hereinafter "NECA") to be Corbett's exclusive collective bargaining representative with authority to bind
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

210.

Id. at 749-50. The NLRB did not issue its Deklewa ruling until February 20, 1987.

Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1375. Therefore, four years had past since the expiration of the
contract (and seven years since Miller's repudiation) before the Board had pronounced its new
Deklewa rule.
211. W.L. Miller, 871 F.2d at 750. The court was satisfied that interest should have

been awarded only for the period from May 1, 1980 to April 30, 1983, and from the time of
the Board's decision in the case, July 23, 1987, until the date that the interest was finally paid.

Id. The court realized "that the Board had a number of concerns which caused it to reevaluate
the issues presented by the case, and that those concerns were not addressed until the decision

in Deklewa." Id. However, the court believed that Miller should not have been obligated "to
pay interest during this deliberate, if not leisurely, consideration of the issues in this action."
Id. (stressing that "to rule otherwise would have been granting the Union a windfall.").
Hence, the court was satisfied that the limited interest which it awarded gave the Union just
recovery for the loss of their benefit funds. Id.
212.
213.

Id.
899 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Corbett to certain prehire agreements entered into with the Interna-

tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 16 (hereinafter
"Union"). 214 Nine years later, in letters to both the NECA and the
Union, "Corbett stated that it was terminating its membership in the
NECA, severing participation in the multi-employer bargaining

group and canceling the letters of assent binding Corbett to bargaining agreements entered into between the NECA and the Union.

21 5

When Corbett sent these letters, both the NECA and the Union
were parties to a contract covering residential electrical work and a
contract covering commercial electrical work. 16 After these letters
were sent, Corbett dishonored both prehire contracts by failing to
"make required dues deductions, contribute to various pension and
employee benefit funds, and, in some cases, pay contractual wage
rates." 217 Subsequently, on December 9, 1982, the Union filed unfair
labor practice charges with the NLRB against Corbett "for repudiating and otherwise failing to comply with the terms of the collective
218
bargaining agreements to which they had previously assented.
An administrative hearing was held addressing these charges.21
Following this administrative hearing, the ALJ found that,
under both the conversion and merger doctrines, the Union had
achieved majority status under section 9(a) of the NLRA. 220 The
214. Corbett was an electrical contractor in the construction industry, and a member of
the Evansville Division, Southern Indiana Chapter, of the National Electrical Contractors Association [hereinafter the "NECA"]. Id. at 609. This corporation was closely held by the Corbett family. Id. Additionally, the Corbett family owned the Bufco Corporation [hereinafter
"Bufco"], basically a closely-held shell corporation incorporated in 1970. Id. 'Sometime prior
to 1983, the familial and corporate patriarch, Bill Corbett, transferred ownership of Bufco to
his wife and son." Id. at 609 n.2. "Electrical contracting work covered under the NECA
agreement was similarly transferred to Bufco." Id.
The Seventh Circuit pointed out that the NLRB had concluded that Bufco was "the alter
ego of Corbett and that the two should be treated as a single employer within the meaning of
the [NLRA]." Id. Since Corbett did not challenge the NLRB's findings, the court did not
waste time addressing "Corbett's sophomoric attempt to use the corporate shell to avoid contractual liability" and enforced the Board's findings. Id.
215. Id. at 609. The letters were dated June 28 and July 2, 1982. Id.
216. Id. The contract covering residential electrical work was effective from October 1,
1981, through September 30, 1983, and the contract covering commercial electrical work was
effective from June 10, 1982, to March 31, 1985. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.; see NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988) (granting representatives--designated or selected by the majority of the employees in the appropriate unit-the
power to collectively bargain on behalf of those employees). Under the R.J. Smith conversion
doctrine, once a union signatory has shown majority support, an otherwise revocable section
8(f) prehire agreement converts into a full-fledged collective bargaining agreement, thereby
granting to the union all the privileges accorded to unions with majority support under section
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AL's finding of "majority status not only established the Union as
the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees during the
term of the prehire agreement, but also imposed a continuing obligation to bargain between the two parties after the agreement's expiration."2 21 Accordingly, the ALJ found that both Corbett and the
Bufco Corporation 222 (collectively, hereinafter "Company') had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA by repudiating the
respective prehire agreements and failing to "recognize the Union as
the exclusive bargaining representative of those employees described
in these prehire agreements. 2 2 3
Subsequent. to the AL's decision, the NLRB issued its
Deklewa decision abandoning the conversion and merger doctrines
relied on by the ALJ.2 2 4 "Instead, the Board held simply that a signatory to a section 8(f) prehire agreement is bound to its terms for
the duration of the agreement unless the employees covered by the
agreement reject the signatory union in a Board conducted election. 2 25 Consequently, the Board applied its recent Deklewa rule
retroactively and held that the Company had violated the NLRA by
unilaterally repudiating its section 8(f) prehire agreements with the
Union.226 The Board accordingly entered an order requiring the
Company to cease and desist from dishonoring its prehire agreements, and filed a petition seeking enforcement of the order. 221
The Seventh Circuit addressed the Board's petition in NLRB v.
Bufco Corporation.2 8 The court held that the promulgation of the
NLRB's new Deklewa rule was not precluded by either the Supreme
Court or circuit case law and found that it was a rational construction of section 8(f).229 Additionally, the court concluded that retroactive application of the NLRB's new rule was not manifestly unjust
9(a) of the NLRA. 899 F.2d at 609-10 n.3; see Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1378-79. "Under
the merger doctrine, 'when a single employer joins a multi-employer association and adopts the
association's collective bargaining agreement, the single employer's unit 'merges' into the
multi-employer unit when the requisite inquiry into majority support occurs in that multiemployer unit.'" Id. (quoting Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1379 & n.14); see Amado Electric,
238 N.L.R.B. at 37 n.1.
221. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d at 610.
222. See supra note 214 (discussing briefly the Bufco Corporation).
223. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d at 610.
224. Id.; see Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377 (overruling the Board's early decision in
R.J. Smith , abandoning the "so-called conversion doctrine, and [modifying] relevant unit
scope rules in 8(f) cases.").
225. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d at 610.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 899 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1990).
229. Id. at 612.
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and, hence, granted the Board's petition for enforcement of its
order.23 0
In addressing the issue of retroactivity, the court noted that,
"[g]enerally, a decision which changes existing law or policy is given
retroactive effect unless retroactive application would cause 'manifest injustice.' "231 The court additionally pointed out that in resolving whether the retroactive application of a newly pronounced Board
rule causes manifest injustice, the court considers the following: "the
reliance of the parties on pre-existing law; the effect of retroactivity
the law; and any injustice arising
on accomplishing the purpose23of
2
from retroactive application.
Applying these factors, the Seventh Circuit was convinced that
the Company would suffer no manifest injustice from the retroactive
application of the Deklewa rule.233 The court agreed that "the
Board's Deklewa rule was an abrupt departure from the Board's former approach. ' 234 Nonetheless, "in light of the Board's merger and
conversion doctrines which could be applied at any time to abrogate
R.J. Smith's unilateral repudiation rule, [the court did] not believe
the Company could have reasonably believed that it could repudiate
its [section] 8(f) agreement with impunity." 23 5 Specifically, the court
concluded that there would be no manifest injustice since: (1) "the
ALJ found that, through the merger and conversion doctrines, the
Union enjoyed section 9(a) majority status and that the Company
would benefit from the retroactive application of a rule which relieved it of a continuing obligation to bargain which it may otherwise
have had"; 236 and (2) evidence existed that the Company had obviously anticipated difficulties in repudiating the agreement. 37 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit upheld the retroactive application of
230. Id.
231. Id. at 611 (citing NLRB v. Affiliated Midwest Hosp. Inc., 789 F.2d 524 (7th Cir.
1986) (quoting NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 757 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)))).

232. Id. at 612 (quoting NLRB v. Chicago Marine Containers, Inc., 745 F.2d 493, 499
(7th Cir. 1984)).
233.

Id.

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. Since the ALJ found that the Union had achieved majority status at the time
when Bufco repudiated the prehire agreements, Bufco would have been precluded from repudi-

ating the agreements, even under the pre-Deklewa rule. Id. Therefore, the court noted that it
"need not and [did] not express an opinion on the correctness of the ALJ's decision and order
applying former Board rules." Id. at 612 n.9.
237.

Id. at 612. The court pointed out that evidence existed that Bufco's actions were

actually a "thinly veiled attempt to funnel work from the prehire signatory Corbett to Bufco."
Id.
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Deklewa in this case.238
C.

Cases Against Retroactivity

Three of the six United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the Deklewa retroactivity issue have refused to apply the
NLRB's new rules retroactively.289 These three circuit courts concluded that retroactivity would work "manifest injustice" on the construction employers involved because, at the time that the respective
employers had repudiated their prehire agreements, there was no evidence that the unions had achieved majority status.2 40 Additionally,
when these cases were finally litigated, each involved "strictly historical disputes," and thus, a representation election could no longer be
effectively held. 241 The following Ninth, Fifth and First Circuit decisions held against the retroactive application of Deklewa.
1. Mesa Verde Construction Company v. Northern California

District Council of Laborers 242

In 1979, Mesa Verde Construction Company (hereinafter
"Mesa Verde") 243 reached its first agreement with the Northern
California District Council of Laborers (hereinafter "Laborers"),
238.

Id.

239.

See C.E.K. Indus. Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 350 (1st Cir.

1990); United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Mar-Len of Louisiana, 906 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1990);
Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 820 F.2d 1006, 1007 (9th
Cir. 1987), reh'g granted [withdrawn], 832 F.2d 1164, reh'g granted en bane, 861 F.2d 1124
(1988), remanded,885 F.2d 594, opinion amended and superseded, 895 F.2d 516 (1989), cert.
111 S. Ct. 209 (1990).
denied, - U.S. _
240. See C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 358 (stat;-g that "manifest injustice would result
from a retroactive application of Deklewa" and that "it]here (wa]s no evidence that the Union
had achieved a majority within the relevant bargaining unit."); Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 203-04
(concluding that "it would work inequitable and unjust results to apply Deklewa retroactively"
and that "there [wa]s no evidence in the record that [the Union] had achieved majority status
prior to repudiation."); Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519 & n.1 (holding "that it would be manifestly unjust to apply Deklewa retroactively in this case" and that the Union's alleged majority
status had never been proven).
241. See C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 358 (stating that the employer was "no longer in
operation, [and therefore,] the "dispute [wa]s purely an historical one at this point."); Marinvolved a "strictly historical
Len, 906 F.2d at 204 n.4 (noting that "the instant case ...
dispute."); Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519 (involving a "strictly historical dispute" in which "a
representative election [could] no longer be held.").
242. 820 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1987), reh'g granted [withdrawn], 832 F.2d 1164, reh'g
granted en bane, 861 F.2d 1124 (1988), remanded,885 F.2d 594, opinion amended and super111 S. Ct. 209 (1990).
U.S. .,
seded, 895 F.2d 516 (1989), cert. denied, 243. Mesa Verde was a general construction contractor, specializing primarily in the
construction of shopping centers in Arizona, California, and Colorado. Id. at 1007. "Mesa
Verde typically subcontract[ed] out most of its work except for some carpentry and odd jobs."
Id.
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and on June 26, 1980, Mesa Verde entered into the prehire agreement with the Laborers that was in dispute in this case.244 Both parties agreed that the contract would remain in effect until June 15,
1983 and, absent written notice by either party, was to continue
thereafter from year to year. 245 "By the contract's terms Mesa Verde
agreed to 'comply with all wages, hours, and working conditions set
forth in the Laborers' Master Agreement for Northern California. 246 In November 1982, both parties agreed to extend their 1980
prehire agreement until June 15, 1986.247
Mesa Verde also entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with the Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Conference
Board (hereinafter "Carpenters") in August 1979, and accepted the
terms of the Carpenters' Master Agreement for Northern California.248 Through a subsequent memorandum agreement executed in
June 1980, the parties accepted a new Carpenters' Master Agreement covering June 16, 1980 to June 15, 1983.249 In September
1982, while the new Master Agreement was still in effect, Mesa
Verde and the Carpenters extended the agreement to June 15, 1986,
"with certain modifications limiting wage increases and providing
more flexible working conditions for Mesa Verde."2 50
In May 1984, Mesa Verde informed both the Laborers and
Carpenters of its intent to abrogate 4s agreements with them.251 At
that time, Mesa Verde was working on a construction project in
Hercules, California, at which it employed members of both unions.252 Mesa Verde notified the Carpenters of its repudiation
through a May 8, 1984 letter, and notified the Laborers through a
244. Id. The Ninth Circuit summarized the facts of this case in its original opinion. See
id. at 1007-08.
245. Id.
246. Id. The agreement was a sixty-seven-page contract between the Laborers, the Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. and the Bay Counties General Contractors Association. Id. The agreement "set wage rates for numerous jobs and provide[d] for arbitration,
with certain exceptions, of 'any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the
agreement.'" Id. at 1007-08.
247. Id. at 1008.
248. Id. The agreement was a forty-nine page contract between the Carpenters, the
Building Industry Association of Northern California, the California Contractors Council,
Inc., and the Millwright Employers Association. Id. It "set rates for numerous jobs and provided for arbitration of '[a]ny dispute concerning the relationship of the parties, any application or interpretation of the agreement.'" Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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May 15, 1984 letter. 53 After its notices to the unions, in either late
May or early June 1984, Mesa Verde began another construction
"project in Orland, California without union workers, in contravention of the collective bargaining agreements, if they were still in effect. 254 Both unions notified Mesa Verde of their grievances and
requested arbitration proceedings with regard to Mesa Verde's contractual obligations for the Orland project. 255 "Mesa Verde then
brought suit against both unions seeking a declaration that it need
not comply with the agreements regarding projects begun after its
repudiations in May 1984. " 256

In Mesa Verde Construction Company v. Northern California
District Council of Laborers,2 7 the district court stayed the Laborer's arbitration proceeding pending resolution of the declaratory
judgment action, and later granted Mesa Verde's summary judgment motion. 58 In an unpublished opinion, the district court also
granted Mesa Verde's summary judgment motion against the
Carpenters.2 5 9 "The court held that the collective bargaining agreements at issue were construction industry 'prehire' agreements, and
that therefore, under [section 8(f) of NLRA], Mesa Verde's May
1984 letters were sufficient to effectively repudiate the agreements
'260
with respect to future projects.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings, finding
that circuit precedent permitted an employer to unilaterally repudiate a prehire collective bargaining agreement. 6 1 Upon rehearing, 6 2
253.

Id.

254.
255.

Id.
Id.

256. Id. Mesa Verde did not seek a declaration of its obligations to either the Laborers
or Carpenters at its ongoing Hercules project. Id.
257. 598 F. Supp. 1092, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 1984), affd, 820 F.2d 1006, 1007-08 (9th Cir.
1987), reh'g granted [withdrawn], 832 F.2d 1164, reh'g granted en banc, 861 F.2d 1124

(1988), remanded,885 F.2d 594, opinion amended andsuperseded, 895 F.2d 516 (1989), cert.
U.S. _,
111 S. Ct. 209 (1990).
258. Mesa Verde, 820 F.2d at 1008. "The court denied a subsequent motion by the
Laborers to vacate its judgment and grant the Laborers additional discovery to demonstrate
denied, -

the existence of a core group of employees." Id. (citing 602 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1985)).
259. Id.
260. Id.

261. Id. at 1013 (finding that the Deklewa decision stood in conflict with prior decisions
of the Ninth Circuit which, absent majority support by the union in the appropriate bargaining
unit, had allowed unilateral repudiation of a prehire agreement).
262. In the original Ninth Circuit opinion, the court noted that "[u]nder Royal Development Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 369 (9th Cir. 1983), [it was] not permitted to overrule
prior panels' interpretations of the [NLRA], even with intervening NLRB case law." Id. The
court believed that this issue should be addressed by the full court in a petition for rehearing
en banc. Id. Additionally, the court noted that the suitability of the Royal Development rule
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the Ninth Circuit's en banc panel adopted Deklewa as the law of the
circuit, holding that a prehire agreement "may not be unilaterally

repudiated by either a union or an employer prior to its termination
or absent an election among the appropriate bargaining unit's employees to reject the union."263 However, the en banc panel remanded the case to determine whether Deklewa should be applied

retroactively.264
In addressing the retroactive application of Deklewa, the en
banc panel directed that retroactivity analysis be governed by Chevron Oil Company v. Huson 65 on remand.2 66 The en banc panel
pointed out that Deklewa overruled "clear precedent that the em-

ployer in Mesa Verde obviously relied on in repudiating the pre-hire
agreements.

26 7

The Laborers took issue with this statement, con-

tending that, at the time Mesa Verde repudiated the agreements,
Ninth Circuit case "law did not permit an employer to unilaterally
repudiate an agreement absent a NLRB election. '268 However, the
court agreed with the en banc panel's determination that Mesa
Verde had relied on clear precedent in unilaterally repudiating the
prehire agreements. 29 The court pointed out that "[a]lthough
neither the Supreme Court nor [the Ninth Circuit] had specifically
addressed the proper method for repudiation, both courts had clearly
held that 'an employer is able to exercise the right of repudiation
also might warrant the review of the full court. Id. at 1013 n.7.
263. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
264. Id. The Ninth Circuit's en banc panel remanded the case for determination of the
retroactivity issue to a typical three-man panel of the Ninth Circuit. See Mesa Verde, 895
F.2d 516, amending and superseding 885 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1989). This panel consisted of
Circuit Judges Nelson, Wiggins and Noonan. See 895 at 517. Circuit Judge Wiggins wrote the
final opinion. Id.
265. 404 U.S. 97 (1971). In Chevron, the Supreme Court articulated three factors germane to retroactivity analysis: "(1) whether the decision to be applied retroactively established
a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have
relied or by deciding an issue of first impression; (2) the effect of retroactivity on accomplishing the purpose of the law; and (3) the inequity imposed by retroactive application." Mesa
Verde, 895 F.2d at 518-19 (paraphrasing the actual Chevron language); see id. at 106-07;
supra notes 107-126 and accompanying text (discussing retroactivity analysis in the federal
courts under Chevron ).
266. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1136-37.
267. Id. at 1137.
268. Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519. The Ninth Circuit noted that the case cited by the
Laborers, Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v. Beck Eng'g & Surveying, 746 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.
1984), however, did not support that proposition. Id. Instead, OperatingEngineers, recognizing
that the Supreme Court had not yet resolved "the question of what specific acts would effect
repudiation of a prehire agreement, expressly declined to decide the issue." Id.; see Operating
Engineers, 746 F.2d at 564-65 (citing Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 270-71 n.11
(1983)).
269. Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519.
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until the union achieves a majority status.' "270
In support of retroactive application, the Laborers argued that
applying Deklewa retroactively would promote the NLRA's statutory objectives of employee free choice and labor relations stability.2171 The Laborers, pointing out that the NLRB had applied
Deklewa retroactively to all cases pending at the administrative
level, the Laborers contended "that the federal courts should also
' 272
apply the rule retroactively to ensure uniformity of decision.
However, the Ninth Circuit specified that "[t]he Board's decision to
apply Deklewa retroactively was not binding on [the] court," 273 and
indicated that at least two district courts had refused to apply
Deklewa retroactively.2 74 The Laborers claimed "that employee free
choice [would] suffer if the Deklewa rule [was] not applied retroactively because courts lack the ability to conduct an election allowing
employees to express their preference. ' 275 However, the court
pointed out that this argument completely disregarded the fact that
in cases such as the one before the court, "'involving strictly historical disputes, a representation election can no longer be effectively
held.' "276
If Deklewa was applied retroactively, the court concluded that
Mesa Verde would have been "'subjected to a penalty for having
taken action which was entirely lawful under pre-Deklewa law without being afforded the opportunity to have their assertion of the
union's lack of majority status tested either by election or by litiga270. Id. at 519 (quoting Jim McNeff, 667 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 461 U.S.
260 (1983)).
271. Id. at 519.
272. Id.
273. Id.; see id. at 519 n.1 (citing NLRB v. Best Products Co., 765 F.2d 903, 913 (9th
Cir. 1985)). In Best Products, the Ninth Circuit held that "while the court is not bound by the
Board's view on retroactive application, it should defer to those views absent manifest injustice." 765 F.2d at 913. The Mesa Verde court pointed out that the Eighth Circuit had adopted
this standard in deciding whether to apply Deklewa retroactively. 895 F.2d at 519 n.1; see
NLRB v. W.L. Miller Co., 871 F.2d 745, 748 (8th Cir. 1989) (deferring to the NLRB's
decision to apply Deklewa retroactively).
Additionally, although the en bane panel directed the court, on remand, to review retroactive application independently under Chevron, the court pointed out that it would have reached
the same conclusion were it to apply the deferential standard. Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519
n.1. The court concluded that it would have been "manifestly unjust to apply Deklewa retroactively in this case because it would [have] effectively punish[ed] the employer for conduct that
was lawful at the time it occurred." Id.
274. Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519 (referring to National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F.
Supp. 731, 735 (D. Md. 1988); ConstructionIndus. Welfare Fund, 672 F. Supp. 291, 294
(N.D. Ill. 1987)).
275. Id.
276. Id. (quoting National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 735).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/6

42

Fineman: The Retroactive Application of Deklewa: Inequitable and Unjust Re

1991]

Retroactive Application of Deklewa

tion.'

",277

Determining that retroactive application of Deklewa would

not have significantly advanced statutory objectives, the Ninth Circuit ruled that "imposing such an injustice on the employer was

clearly unwarranted.

278

Applying the Chevron factors to the facts before it, the court

ascertained that:
(1) the existing law [at the time of Mesa Verde's repudiation]
clearly allowed either party to repudiate the pre-hire agreement
prior to the union's attainment of majority status; (2) retroactive
application would [have punished Mesa Verde] for doing something that was lawful when done; and (3) advancement of statutory
objectives [wa]s only questionably served by retroactive application
when the279 relationship between the parties ha[d] been
terminated.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that retroactive application of

the Deklewa rule was inappropriate and affirmed the judgment
below.280
2.

United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners Local Union
953 v. Mar-Len of Louisiana, Inc.2"'

In 1981, Mar-Len of Louisiana, Inc. (hereinafter "MarLen"),282 entered into prehire agreements with the United Brother-

hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local Union 953 (hereinafter "Carpenters"), the International Association of Bridge,
Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Union No. 678
(hereinafter "Iron Workers"), and the Construction and General La277. Id. (quoting National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 735).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 519-20. The Ninth Circuit phrased its conclusions regarding the Chevron
factors in a very broad fashion. Even though the case before it specifically dealt with Mesa
Verde, the Laborers, and the Carpenters, the court chose to state its conclusions using the
broad terms of "the employer" and "the unions." See id. This could be viewed as a deliberate
effort to stress the injustice--created by the retroactive application of Deklewa-placed upon
any construction industry employer who has properly relied upon pre-Deklewa law when repudiating a prehire agreement with a union.
Recently, in Camping Construction Company v. District Council of Iron Workers, 915
F.2d 1333, (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit specifically reiterated its holdings in Mesa
Verde by stating that "the Deklewa rule would not be applied to employers who repudiated
prior to February 20, 1987, the date of the Deklewa decision." Id. at 1337 n.2. As a result, the
Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the employer,
Camping Construction Company, had effectively repudiated its prehire agreement under preDeklewa law prior to February 20, 1987. Id. at 1350.
280. Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 520.
281. 906 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1990)
282. Mar-Len was a construction industry contractor. Id. at 201.
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borers, Local Union 207 (hereinafter "Laborers"). 8 These prehire
agreements bound the various "parties to the terms of master collective bargaining agreements entered into
between the unions and the
28 4
Associated General Contractors, Inc.9
On April 15, 1983, Mar-Len commenced work on the DeRidder, Louisiana Phase Two Wastewater Improvements-Transfer Stations pursuant to a contract with the City of DeRidder, Louisiana,
(hereinafter "DeRidder").2 85 However, after a contract dispute with
DeRidder, Mar-Len ceased work on the project on January 19,
1984, as a result of the city's failure to pay Mar-Len for work performed under the contract. 286 On June 5, 1984, Mar-Len notified the
Carpenters, Iron Workers, and Laborers that it was unilaterally repudiating any collective bargaining agreements that were allegedly
in effect. 287 On July 12, 1984, Mar-Len similarly informed each of
the union's fringe benefit funds of its repudiation of the agreements
2 88
and refused to make any further contributions.
283. Id. Mar-Len entered into prehire agreements with the Carpenters on January 27,
1981; the Iron Workers on February 29, 1981; and the Laborers on January 27 and August 5,
1981. Id.
284. Id.; see Brief for Appellee at 4, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners Local Union
953 v. Mar-Len of Louisiana, Inc., 906 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-4456) [hereinafter
Appellee Brie]. These agreements were designated and captioned as "short form" and "assent
agreements." Appellee Brief,supra, at 4. These agreements were the only contracts, or collective bargaining agreemehts, entered into between the parties, and were applicable only to work
being performed by Mar-Len on the DeRidder Phase Two Wastewater Improvements Project.
Id. With the exception of the prehire agreement between Mar-Len and the Iron Workers, each
prehire agreement contained an expiration date and automatic renewal provision in the absence of notice from either party of its desire to modify or terminate the agreements at least
sixty days prior to the anniversary date of the agreements. Id. at 4-5.
285. Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 201.
286. Id. On or about August 19, 1983, Mar-Len instituted arbitration proceedings
against DeRidder because of a dispute with DeRidder and its consulting engineer over the
project design. Appellee Brief, supra note 284, at 4. DeRidder filed a counterclaim against
Mar-Len, and around November 7, 1983, ceased payment to Mar-Len for the work performed
under the contract. Id. at 5-6. On December 21, 1983, the Council of DeRidder passed an
ordinance authorizing DeRidder to institute legal and arbitration proceedings against Mar-Len
for the settlement of the dispute. Id. at 6. Subsequently, on or about January 19, 1984, as a
result of DeRidder's failure to pay Mar-Len, Mar-Len ceased work on the project. Id.
287. Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 201. Mar-Len asserted its right to repudiate pursuant to
previous Fifth Circuit holdings in Baton Rouge Building and Construction Trades Council v.
E.C. Schafer Construction Co., Inc., 657 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1981), and NLRB v. Haberman
Construction Co., 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981). Id.
288. Id. At the time of Mar-Len's repudiation, no work was being performed on the
DeRidder wastewater project, and concomitantly, there were no employees on the project performing work under the prehire agreements. Appellee Brief, supra note 284, at 7.
Mar-Len did not resume work on the project until October 9, 1985, following a settlement
with DeRidder. 906 F.2d at 201. Afterwards, "the unions formally grieved the company's
failure to rehire the workers laid off in January 1984 and its failure to use the unions' hiring
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The Carpenters and the Laborers commenced an action against
Mar-Len on March 10, 1986, alleging that Mar-Len had unlawfully
repudiated the collective bargaining agreements which covered work
28 9
it was performing at the DeRidder wastewater facility. The Iron
Workers also filed suit against Mar-Len on April 28, 1986, claiming
substantially the same allegations.2 90 "Both actions, which were con2 a and
solidated, were brought under section 301 of the [LMRA]
sought declaratory and monetary relief [for breach of the prehire
292
agreements], including lost wages, benefits, and attorney's fees."
The district court issued its opinion on November 17, 1988.293
The court stated that the main issue involved in the case "was
whether, in repudiating the collective bargaining agreements with

'
the unions, Mar-Len violated section 8(f) [of the NLRA] . 294 The
district court then noted when the parties entered into the prehire
agreements, the NLRB's interpretation of section 8(f) was that "prehire agreements [we]re unilaterally voidable unless and until the relevant union achieve[d] majority status. ' 295 However, the district

court also pointed out "that the NLRB had later reversed itself in

Deklewa, holding that prehire agreements may not be repudiated
prior to expiration, except pursuant to a vote to decertify the union
under [sections] 9(c) or 9(e) [of the NLRA]."296 The district court

approved the NLRB's new interpretation of section 8(f) law anhall for rehire purposes." Id. "Mar-Len responded by denying the existence and/or validity of
any collective bargaining agreement between the company and the unions." Id. "The
Carpenters worked on the wastewater project through the week ending November 11, 1986;
the Iron Workers, the week ending March 18, 1986; and the Laborers, the week ending November 25, 1986." Id. at 201-02.
289. Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 202.
290. Id.
291. Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988) (discussing suits
by and against labor organizations).
292. Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 202.
293. Id.
294. Id. The court first determined that it had jurisdiction of the case under section 301
of the LMRA. Id.
295. Id. The district court specifically noted that when Mar-Len and the unions first
entered into the prehire agreements, the NLRB's interpretation of section 8(f) had been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Higdon. Id. at 202; see Higdon, 434 U.S. 335 (1978) (upholding the Board's R.J. Smith interpretation of section 8(f) law). Furthermore, the court
pointed out that the Supreme Court's Higdon decision had been followed by the Fifth Circuit.
Id. (citing Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.
1982), Baton Rouge Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. E.C. Schafer Constr. Co., Inc., 657
F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1981), and NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir.
1981)).
296. Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 202; see Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987), enforced sub
nom. 843 F.2d 770 (3rd Cir. 1988); NLRA §§ 9(c) & 9(e), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c), (e) (1988).
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nounced in Deklewa, but refused to apply it retroactively. 297 In support of this conclusion, the district court pointed out that:
the policies Deklewa identified as underlying section 8(f)-freedom
of contract and promoting employee free choice and labor relations
stability-would not be furthered by retroactive application under
the circumstances of this case: that is, prohibiting Mar-Len from
voiding its prehire agreements with the unions would serve to penalize the company for undertaking an act that, at the time it did
so, it was legally permitted to do.298
However, the district court found that at the time Mar-Len repudiated the prehire agreements, "the unions had achieved majority
status."299 Therefore, the court concluded that, even under the preDeklewa rule, Mar-Len was precluded from unilaterally repudiating
the prehire agreements.300 The court further held, however, that
Mar-Len's June 5, 1984 letters to the unions, "in which it denied the
existence of any valid collective bargaining agreements and repudiated any agreement alleged to exist, caused the prehire agreements
to expire by their own terms on the following dates: the Laborers, on
April 30, 1985; the Carpenters, on May 1, 1985; and the Iron Workers, on April 30, 1986. ' '3o1
Accordingly, the district court entered judgment in favor of the
unions on June 1, 1989. The court awarded back pay and fringe benefits to two individuals represented by the Iron Workers. 30° However,
neither the Carpenters nor the Laborers received any compensation
since all work performed on the DeRidder project by individuals of
these unions occurred after the respective prehire agreements terminated.3 03 As a result, Mar-Len, the Carpenters, and the Laborers
appealed. 0 4
In United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners Local Union
953 v. Mar-Len of Louisiana, Inc.,30 5 the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling and remanded the case for entry of a judgment
297.
298.

Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 202.
Id. The district court cited ConstructionIndustry Welfare Fund, 672 F. Supp. 291

(N.D. Ill. 1987), in support of its determinations. Id.
299. Id.
300.

Id.

301. Id.
302. Id. at 203. The district court refused to award attorney's fees to the unions "since it
concluded that Mar-Len's repudiation of the prehire agreements was founded upon its reasonable belief that it had a right to do so." Id.
303. See id.; Appellee Brief,supra note 284, at 4.
304.

Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 202.

305. 906 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1990).
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of dismissal.3"6 The Fifth Circuit stated that the primary question
before it was "whether the NLRB's present interpretation of [sec-

tion] 8(f), announced in Deklewa, is the controlling law in [the Fifth
30 7
Circuit] and [wa]s to be applied retroactively in this case." The
court "assume[d] for the purpose of th[e] opinion that Deklewa
30 8
[wa]s the controlling law in th[eir] circuit," but did not adjudicate

the actual question because it held that, "in any event, Deklewa
'
could not be applied retroactively in this case."30

In deciding whether to apply Deklewa retroactively to the pre-

sent case, the court applied the factors set out in Chevron v. Hu3 11 First, the court found
son,310 and made various determinations.
that "the nonvoidability of prehire agreements [wa]s a new rule insofar as it overruled clear past precedent on which Mar-Len clearly
relied" in repudiating its prehire agreements with the unions, and
the NLRB's turnabout regarding section 8(f) of the NLRA "was not
306. Id. at 204.
307. Id. at 203.
308. Id. In support of its assumption, the court cited a number of circuit cases which
had previously adopted Deklewa as controlling law. See id. (citing Ornamental Iron Workers,
843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988), W.L. Miller Co., 871 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1989), Mesa Verde, 885
F.2d 594, on remand after 861 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), and Bufco Corp., 899
F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1990)).
To adjudicate whether Deklewa was the controlling law in the Fifth Circuit, the court
would have had to "examine an issue that had not been briefed or argued: whether [it was]
bound by the precedent of prior panels." Id. at 203 n.2 (referring to its prior decisions in
Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1982), Baton
Rouge Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. E.C. Schafer Constr. Co., Inc., 657 F.2d 806 (5th
Cir. 1981), and NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981)). The prior
panels had expressly affirmed the NLRB's pre-Deklewa interpretation of section 8(f) prehire
agreements. Id. The court noted that "[t]his analysis [would have] involve[d] close, complex
issues that [the court] thought should not be addressed in the absence of briefing and argument, especially when it was unnecessary to do so in order to resolve the case before [it]." Id.
(citations omitted).
309. Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 203.
310. 404 U.S. 97 (1971); see supra notes 107-126 and accompanying text (discussing
retroactivity analysis in the federal courts under Chevron).
311. 906 F.2d at 203. The Fifth Circuit considered the following factors:
[F]irst, whether Deklewa establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling
clear past precedent on which the parties may have relied or by deciding an issue of
first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; second, whether in
the light of the prior history of section 8(f), its purpose and effect, retroactive application of Deklewa furthers or retards its operation; and third, whether retrospective
application would produce substantial inequitable results.
Id.; see Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07; Phillips v. Marine Concrete Structures, Inc., 895 F.2d
1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1990). Mar-Len, the Carpenters, and the Laborers stipulated to all of the
facts which the Fifth Circuit based its determinations regarding the Chevron factors. See MarLen, 906 F.2d at 201.
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clearly foreshadowed by the Board's prior cases." ' Second, the
court was "unable to conclude that retrospective application of
Deklewa would [have] further[ed] the operation of the Board's new
interpretation of [section] 8(f) because work on the job at issue
[wa]s complete." 1 " Third, "with respect to the third Chevron factor,
[the court] conclude[d] that retroactive application of Deklewa
would [have] produce[d] 'substantial inequitable results.'"314 The

court based this finding on the fact that, upon entering into the
prehire agreements, Mar-Len had expressly relied on its then-existing right to unilaterally repudiate, absent majority status by the
union. 315 And, furthermore, as the stipulated record showed, both
the Carpenters and Laborers presented no evidence that either of
them had achieved majority status prior to Mar-Len's repudiation-almost three years prior to the Board's decision in Deklewa.3 6
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the retroactive
application of Deklewa would have worked inequitable and unjust
results, and held that, "even if [it] adopted Deklewa, [it] would not
apply it retroactively so as to hold Mar-Len liable. '3 17 Therefore,
312. Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 203. This was evidenced by Mar-Len's June 5, 1984 letters
to the unions in which it specifically cited Baton Rouge Building and Construction Trades
Council v. E.C. Schafer Construction Co., Inc., 657 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1981) and NLRB v.
Haberman Construction Co., 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981). Id.
313. Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 203.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 203-04. The Unions had conceded at oral argument that there was "no evidence in the record that they had achieved majority status prior to Mar-Len's repudiation [of
the prehire agreements]." Id. Mar-Len had argued to the court that, when he had repudiated
the agreements, "the unions had not achieved majority status because, as a result of MarLen's dispute with DeRidder, the contract had terminated and no employees were on the job
site." Id. at 204 n.3. The district court rejected this argument since it "held that Mar-Len's
contract with DeRidder had only been interrupted, not terminated. .. ." Id. Assuming "that
the unions had achieved majority status prior to the cessation of work on January 9, 1984, [the
court] concluded that their majority status remained intact upon their return to work following
Mar-Len's settlement with DeRidder on October 9, 1985." Id. However, the court failed to
delineate what it had based its assumption on. See id. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit pointed
out that the unions had conceded the absence of evidence in the record supporting this assumption. Id.
317. Id. at 204. At the time that Mar-Len was decided, four other circuits had addressed the retroactive application of Deklewa and had split in their decisions. Id. at 204 n.4.
The court, aware of these decisions, pointed out that the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits
had applied Deklewa retroactively. Id. (citing Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d 770 (3rd
Cir. 1988), NLRB v. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1990), and NLRB v. W.L. Miller
Co., 871 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1989)). These courts had held that retroactivity would work no
"manifest injustice" on the respective employers "because, at the time the respective employers repudiated the prehire agreement, the unions had achieved majority status; therefore, even
under the pre-Deklewa rule, the employers would have been precluded from repudiating the
agreements." Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 204 n.4. On the other hand, the court recognized that "a
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although the court agreed with the district court's holding against
the retroactive application of Deklewa, the court found no evidence
supporting the district court's conclusion that the unions had ever
achieved majority status. 18 Hence, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court's holding that Mar-Len was precluded from unilaterunions, and disally repudiating its prehire agreements with31 the
9
missed the Carpenters' and Laborers' claims.
3 20
C.E.K. Industrial Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB
In November 1979, Robert Bradley incorporated CAM-FUL
Industries, Inc. (hereinafter "Cam-Ful"), to enter into the real estate
business.3 21 Bradley and his partner, Peter Nowyj, provided all of
Cam-Ful's financing.322 Upon its inception, Cam-Ful was a weekend
operation and both men were employed full-time with other companies.3 23 Cam-Ful's "primary function was preparing foreclosed-upon
properties for resale, and its activities included general construction,
Nowyj originally
plumbing and janitorial services. '3 24 Bradley and
3 25
performed most of Cam-Ful's work themselves
In April 1981, Bradley dropped his other job and formed
C.E.K. Industrial Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (hereinafter
"CEK"), a construction contractor specializing in plumbing.3 26 After
incorporating CEK, Bradley modified Cam-Ful's certificate of organization to provide that Cam-Ful's primary function was performing
construction work.3 27 "Bradley's goal in forming CEK was apparently to run it as a double-breasted operation, parallel with Cam-

3.

divided panel of the Ninth Circuit had refused to apply Deklewa retroactively." Id. (referring
to Mesa Verde, 885 F.2d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1989)). The court further noted that "Mesa
Verde, like the instant case, involved a "'strictly historical' dispute.'" Id. (quoting Mesa

Verde, 885 F.2d at 507) (quoting National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. 731, 735 (D.
Md. 1988))). The Fifth Circuit pointed out that, "[tiherefore, the Mesa Verde majority had

concluded that retroactivity would not promote employee free choice because no decertification
election could be held and would only serve to penalize the employer for exercising its right to

repudiate." Id.
318. Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 204.
319. Id.
320.

921 F.2d 350 (1st Cir. 1990).

321. Id. at 351.
322. Id. at 351-52. "Bradley provided 75% of financing for Cam-Ful and acted as its
president; his partner Peter Nowyj provided the balance of the capital and held the title of

secretary-treasurer." Id.
323. Id. at 352.
324. Id.
325.
326.

Id.
Id. "Bradley was the sole owner of CEK, but because of local licensing require-

ments, CEK issued 51% of its stock to a licensed master plumber." Id.
327. Id.
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Ful, enabling him to bid on both union (via CEK) and non-union
(via Cam-Ful) contracts." 32 8
Pursuant to this goal, Bradley signed, on behalf of CEK, a collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") between
the Master Plumbing Association (hereinafter "Association"), a
multi-employer group, and the Plumbers and Gasfitters Local 54 of
the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry (hereinafter "Union") in September 1981.329 The Agreement was a construction industry prehire

agreement authorized by section 8(f) of the NLRA. 33 0 However,
CEK did not join the Association as a member. 3
The Agreement between the Association and the Union operated from July 1, 1981, to June 30, 1983, and "provided for a oneyear automatic renewal unless either party gave 60 days written notice to the other of intent to terminate. '332 Adhering to this clause,
the Association timely notified the Union of its termination and requested renegotiation of the Agreement in 1983. 333 In June 1983,
both parties reached a new collective bargaining agreement and,
during the following month, the Union invited CEK and the other
respective contractors to adopt the new Agreement. 4 Shortly thereafter, CEK declined to adopt the new Agreement. 35 However, CEK
notified the Union of its willingness to engage in individual bargaining for a separate collective bargaining agreement. 338
328.

Id. The First Circuit briefly described "double-breasting" as follows:

A double-breasted operation occurs when the same owner owns both a union and a
non-union company. The non-union company bids on jobs that do not require a
union contractor, while the union company bids on union jobs. Both companies can
thus bid more competitively in their respective markets. Double-breasted operations
in the construction industry are not inherently illegal under the NLRA.

Id. at 352 n.3 (citing A. Dariano & Sons, Inc. v. District Council of Painters No. 33, 869 F.2d
514, 517 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Levine, Pre-hireAgreements and "Doublebreasting"In the
ConstructionIndustry: Prospectsfor Legislative Change, 39 LAB. L.J. 247 (1988) (discussing the history and present status of construction industry "double-breasting").
329. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 352. "Local 54, the original charging party, subse-

quently merged with other locals to become Local Union No. 267 of the Plumbers Union." Id.
at 352 n.4.
330. Id. at 352.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. During this period, the Union became aware that Bradley was operating two

construction companies-one union and one non-union. Id. When originally approached by the
Union, Bradley denied the Union's allegations; however, he later contended that the two com-

panies constituted a legitimate double-breasted enterprise. Id. Subsequently, the Union made
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In the fall of 1983, Bradley closed down CEK.33 7 "Its two remaining employees, both Union members, were transferred to CamFul's payroll... [and] CEK's equipment was divided between Bradley and Cam-Ful."3 38 Cam-Ful then assumed and completed all
work remaining on projects begun by CEK and "continued to oper3 39
ate as a construction contractor handling some plumbing work."
Subsequently, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the NLRB. 340 The charge was based upon the failure of CEK
and Cam-Ful "to apply the terms of the CEK collective bargaining
agreement with the Union to the workers performing plumbing work
for Cam-Ful." 341 The Union also filed another charge based upon
Bradley's failure to provide the Union with certain information it
43
requested.3" 2 As a result, the NLRB issued a complaint.
After a hearing addressing these charges, an administrative law
judge (hereinafter "AL") dismissed the complaint, refusing to find
34
"The ALJ also
alter ego status as between CEK and Cam-Ful.
Union had not
the
found that the Agreement between CEK and
been automatically renewed; rather, it had been effectively termi345
nated when the Association gave timely notice to the Union.1 Finally, the ALJ concluded that Bradley's failure to provide the requested information did not constitute a violation.346
"The Board disagreed with the ALJ,finding that an alter ego
relationship existed between CEK and Cam-Ful based on the common ownership, financial management, and business purpose of both
The Board also found that CEK had sent no individcompanies.'
several attempts "to obtain more information from Bradley about the structure of the two
companies, but these efforts generated only late and sketchy responses." Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 353. The Fifth Circuit noted that "[ailthough there was no doubt that both
CEK and Cam-Ful shared common ownership, and in fact constituted a single employer under
the NLRA, the ALJ concluded that because of an absence of anti-union motive, and because
Cam-Ful had pre-existed CEK, the two companies were not alter egos." Id. 'These two facts,
in the AL's view, precluded a finding that Bradley had structured both companies so that he
could divert work from the union to the non-union operation." Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. "The Board treated Cam-Ful's prior existence as nondeterminative, because after the creation of CEK, Cam-Ful's incorporation certificate was modified to allow it to perform work similar to that for which CEK was incorporated." Id. Moreover, the Board believed
that "the nature of Cam-Ful's operations after the closing of CEK demonstrated the existence
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ual termination notice to the Union, and therefore, the Agreement
had been automatically renewed.3,48 Based on these determinations,
the Board concluded that both companies had violated sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 8 9 Additionally, the Board held
that Bradley's failure to provide information to the Union amounted
to bargaining in bad faith, and thus, constituted a violation of section 8(a)(5).3 ° Accordingly, CEK and Cam-Ful petitioned the First
Circuit for review of the Board's Order and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. 351
In C.E.K. Industrial Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB,35 2
the First Circuit was presented with the issue of whether the
NLRB's finding that CEK and Cam-Ful violated the NLRA by failing to apply the terms of its section 8(f) prehire agreement to unit
employees was supported by substantial evidence. 3 3 In order to resolve this issue, the court was required to address several subsidiary
issues: "(1) whether CEK and Cam-Ful [we]re alter egos; (2)
whether the collective bargaining agreement between CEK (through
an employers association) and the Union [had] terminated or was
automatically renewed; and (3) whether the Companies should [have
been] held retroactively to the Board's new position [in Deklewa]
regarding the repudiation of [section] 8(f) prehire construction
agreements. 3 5 4
of an alter ego relationship." Id.; see supra notes 338-339 and accompanying text (discussing
Cam-Ful's actions when CEK closed down).
348. Id. The Board held that CEK, "a non-member which had not delegated its bargaining authority, was not entitled to rely upon the notice sent by the Association." Id.
349. Id.; see NLRA §§ 8(a)(1) & 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (5) (1988). The
Board's decision is reported at 295 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 131 L.R.R.M. 1737 (1989).
350. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 353; see NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1988).
351. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 353. The Union intervened in support of the Board's
holdings. Id.
352. 921 F.2d 350 (Ist Cir. 1990).
353. See id. at 351.
354. Id. The court also addressed the issue of whether the Board's finding that Bradley's
failure to provide the information requested by the Union constituted an unfair labor practice
was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 359-60. While the court found that substantial
evidence did exist in support of the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice, since the remedy of ordering Bradley to supply the requested information at the time of the decision was
pointless, the court declined to enforce that portion of the Board's order. Id.
CEK and Cam-Ful also raised the statute of limitations for unfair labor practice proceedings. Id. at 351 n.2; see NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988). However, the court found
that both Cam-Ful and CEK had "waived this affirmative defense by failing to raise it before
the Board." Id. at 351 n.2; see Woelke and Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645,
665-66 (1982) (holding that judicial review was barred under NLRA section 10(e) since the
issue in dispute was not raised during the proceedings before the Board); NLRA § 10(e), 29
U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988).
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First, the First Circuit found that the Board's finding of alter

3 55
Second, the
ago status was supported by substantial evidence.

court agreed with the Board's finding that the Agreement was auto-

matically renewed, and thus, "had remained in force with respect to
CEK.' 356 Third, the court held that the retroactive application of
Deklewa would result in manifest injustice and refused to retroac-

tively hold CEK and Cam-Ful to the Board's new position regarding
3 57
the repudiation of section 8(f) prehire construction agreements.

Accordingly, the First Circuit denied the enforcement of the Board's
order.358
In addressing the issue of whether Deklewa should be applied

retroactively, the court pointed out that although most of the courts

59
of appeals that had confronted Deklewa had approved the rule,3

s0
those courts had split on whether to apply Deklewa retroactively.
While, the court had not yet considered the issue, they noted the

355. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 354; see id. at 353-55 (discussing in-depth the "alter
ego" issue, including the alter ego concept, ingeneral; alter ego analysis; relevant case law;
and their application to the evidence in the record). Both CEK and the Union agreed on the
factors used to determine alter ego status. Id. at 354. The First Circuit recognized these factors as anti-union animus and "substantially identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, and supervision, as well as ownership." Id. (quoting Advance
Elec., 268 N.L.R.B. 1001, 1002 (1984)).
356. Id. at 356; see id. at 355-56 (discussing the "termination or automatic renewal"
issue).
The court noted that the circuit courts were "divided on the issue of the degree of deference to give to Board interpretations of collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 356. Compare, e.g., Local Union 1395, IBEW v. NLRB, 797 F.2d 1027, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating
that "the Board's interpretation of contractual provisions is entitled to 'no particular deference' ") with NLRB v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1362 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that deference is appropriate). The court found, "however, that even under a less deferential posture, the Board's analysis of the contract was reasonable and supported by the
evidence." C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 356.
357. Id. at 358.
358. Id. at 360.
359. Id. at 357. The court agreed with their fellow circuits in holding that:
(1) Supreme Court precedent is not an obstacle to adoption of Deklewa, because in
Jim McNeff, Inc., 461 U.S. 260, and Higdon, 434 U.S. 335, the Court was merely
accepting the old R.J. Smith rule as within the Board's authority and not adopting
the rule based on the Court's independent analysis; (2) the legislative history of 8(f)
supports the Deklewa non-repudiation rule better than the R.J. Smith approach;
and (3) the Deklewa rule is an improvement over R.J. Smith in furthering the
NLRA's policies of labor stability and employee free choice.
Id.; see Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1128-34. Therefore, the court adopted Deklewa as the controlling law in the First Circuit. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 357.
360. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 357. See supra notes 131-319 and accompanying text
in the retroactive application of Deklewa among the other circuit courts of
(discussing the split
appeals).
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clear import of Deklewa, especially in the case at hand.38 1 The court
found that, under "[p]re-Deklewa, CEK would have been acting
fully within its rights in repudiating its prehire agreement with the
Union, provided that the Union had not achieved majority status
under the conversion and merger doctrines. 362 However, "[u]nder
Deklewa, CEK would have had to conduct an election to ensure that
the Union lacked a majority before repudiating the contract with
impunity." 63 Therefore, the court was required to adjudicate
whether it was appropriate to apply Deklewa retroactively against
CEK and Cam-Ful.3" Lastly, the court stressed that "[a]ccording a
newly adopted rule retroactive effect is proper unless 'manifest injustice' results."365
In examining the various circuit cases deciding whether or not
to give retroactive effect to Deklewa, the First Circuit noted that two
factors appeared to be controlling-one weighing for retroactivity
and the other against.366 The first factor that the court pointed out
was the apparent majority status of the unions prior to repudiation. 67 In those cases applying Deklewa retroactively against the
construction industry employer, "there was evidence that the unions
had nearly or actually achieved majority status through the conver361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 357 (quoting NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home, Inc., 720 F.2d 726,
729 (Ist Cir. 1983) (citing Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974))).
The court pointed out in a footnote that last term in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.
v. Bonjorno, U.S..._, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1577 (1990), the Supreme Court had identified,
but failed to resolve, an apparent tension between the approach announced in Bradley v.
School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. at 715 (ruling that courts should apply newly enacted law
in effect at the time of appellate decision unless retroactive application would result in manifest injustice) and that expressed in Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208
(1988) (stating that "[c]ongressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result."). Id. at 357-58 n.7,
In deciding the retroactivity issue, the First Circuit has suggested that the standard is whether
retroactive application of a newly promulgated "principle would alter substantive rules of conduct and disappoint private expectations." Id.; see Demars v. First Serv. Bank for Say., 907
F.2d 1237, 1239-40 (1st Cir. 1990) (recognizing the "disappointment of private expectations"
as an essential factor in considering the retroactivity issue); see also American Trucking
Ass'ns v. Smith, U.S. .._,
110 S. Ct. 2323, 2338 (1990) (stating that "[w]hen the
Court concludes that a law-changing decision should not be applied retroactively, its decision
is usually based on its perception that such application would have a harsh and disruptive
effect on those who have relied on prior law .... If the operative conduct or events occurred
before the law-changing decision, a court should apply the law prevailing at the time of the
conduct.")
366. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 358.
367. See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/6

54

Fineman: The Retroactive Application of Deklewa: Inequitable and Unjust Re
Retroactive Application of Deklewa

1991]

sion doctrine."3 68 "These courts reasoned that there would be no
manifest injustice in applying Deklewa because even under the old
rule the employer had acted at their own risk in repudiating the
agreement. ' 369 The second factor which the court noted was "the
historical or ongoing nature of the dispute.137 0 In those cases in
which there was "no representation election still to be held and
where the dispute was purely historical, the policies of labor stability
and employee free choice would not [have been] served by applying
under the cirDeklewa to past conduct. 3 71 These courts held that
3 72
inappropriate.
clearly
was
cumstances, retroactivity
Considering these factors, the First Circuit found that the present dispute was one in which a retroactive application of Deklewa
would result in manifest injustice.37 3 The court found that there was
no evidence in the record that the Union had ever achieved majority
status within the relevant bargaining unit.37 4 "Moreover, as CEK
[wa]s no longer in operation, the dispute [wa]s purely an historical
one at th[at] point.37 5 Accordingly, the First Circuit concluded that
applying Deklewa retroactively would subject both CEK and CamFul "to a penalty for having taken action which was entirely lawful
under pre-Deklewa law."137 6 Hence, the First Circuit refused to uphold the retroactive application of the Board's new interpretations in
377
Deklewa
D. Aligning The Split Among The Circuits
Although the six United States Courts of Appeals cases discussed above split in their decisions regarding retroactivity, each
court based its holding on the same underlying consideration. As
demonstrated throughout these cases, under certain circumstances,
pre-Deklewa law and post-Deklewa law can generate two vastly different results for construction industry employers. Each of the six
circuit courts recognized these results in determining whether the
retroactive application of the Board's new section 8(f) interpreta368. Id.; see Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d at 612; W.L. Miller, 871 F.2d at 749; Ornamental
Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 781.
369. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 358.

370. Id.
371.
372.

Id.; see Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 203-04; Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519.
See Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 203-04; Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519.

373. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 358.
374.

Id.

375. Id.
376. Id.; see Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519 (quoting National Automatic Sprinkler, 680
F. Supp. at 735).
377. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 358.
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tions, as announced in Deklewa, would produce "manifest injustice"
for the respective construction industry employer.3 7 8
In the three circuit cases holding for retroactivity, each court
specifically discerned that the record involved contained persuasive
evidence that the respective union(s) had achieved majority status.37,
These courts pointed out that, even under pre-Deklewa law, the construction industry employers could not lawfully have repudiated their
prehire agreements since the union(s) had achieved majority status.380 In these cases, the Third, Seventh and Eighth Circuits determined that pre- and post-Deklewa law yielded the same results, and
therefore, held that the retroactive application of Deklewa would
work no manifest injustice on the respective employer.381 Accordingly, these courts upheld the retroactive application of Deklewa.3 82
In the three circuit cases holding against retroactivity, each
court specifically recognized that the respective record contained no
378. See C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 357 (pointing out the specific difference in result
under pre-Deklewa and post-Deklewa law); Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 203-04 & n.4 (noting that
the retroactive application of Deklewa would penalize Mar-Len for action which was rightful
under pre-Deklewa law); Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d at 612 (concluding that the Union had
achieved majority status, and thus, under both pre- and post-Deklewa law, Bufco could not
have rightfully repudiated); Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519 (stating that applying Deklewa retroactively would subject Mesa Verde "to a penalty for having taken action which was entirely
lawful under pre-Deklewa law"); W.L. Miller Co., 871 F.2d at 749-50 (holding that "Miller
was already bound to an enforceable contract" under pre-Deklewa law, and thus, the retroactive application of Deklewa would not produce manifest injustice); OrnamentalIron Workers,
843 F.2d at 781 (stating that "even under the old R.J. Smith rule it appears entirely likely
that the Board would have held that Deklewa was not free to repudiate its agreement with the
Union.").
379. See Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d at 612 (finding that "through the merger and conversion doctrines the Union enjoyed 9(a) majority status"); W.L. Miller Co., 871 F.2d at 749
(supporting the ALJ's findings that the Union enjoyed "majority status in the multiemployer
unit which Miller voluntarily joined"); Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 781 & n.14
(pointing out that the record included evidence of "actual union membership of a majority of
the employees")
380. See Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d at 612 (concluding that the Union had achieved majority status, and thus, under both pre-Deklewa law, Bufco could not have rightfully repudiated); W.L. Miller Co., 871 F.2d at 749-50 (holding that, under pre-Deklewa law, Miller was
bound to an enforceable contract, and thus, could not lawfully repudiate its agreement with
the Union); Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 781 (stating that "under the old R.J.
Smith rule it appears entirely likely that the Board would have held that Deklewa was not free
to repudiate its agreement with the Union.").
381. See supra note 378 and accompanying text (noting that in these cases, both preand post-Deklewa law yielded the same results).
382. See Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d at 612 (joining "the Third and Eighth Circuit in their
acceptance of the Board's decision to retroactively apply the Deklewa rule to cases such as the
one before [it]."); W.L. Miller Co., 871 F.2d at 750 (deferring to the Board's decision to apply
Deklewa retroactively); OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d at 781 (enforcing the Board's
order applying Deklewa retroactively).
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evidence of majority support by the union."' 3 These cases had been
pending for some time and representation elections could no longer
have been effectively held either because the construction projects
involved had been completed, 84 the appropriate prehire agreements
had expired by their own terms,38 5 or circumstances had changed
with the passage of time. 8 6 These courts pointed out that, under preDeklewa law, the construction industry employers had lawfully repudiated their prehire agreements since the unions had not achieved
majority support of the workers.38 7 However, each court generally
discerned that the respective employer's repudiation would be unlawful under post-Deklewa law since the anti-repudiation rule announced in Deklewa made union majority status irrelevant.3 8 In
these cases, since pre- and post-Deklewa law yielded substantially
different results, the First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits found that undeniable manifest injustice would result if the Board's Deklewa interpretation of section 8(f) law was applied retroactively. 8 9 Accord383. See C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 357 (finding that "[tihere [wa]s no evidence that
the Union has achieved a majority within the relevant bargaining unit."); Mar-Len, 906 F.2d
at 203-04 & n.4 (noting that "there [wa]s no evidence in the record that [the Union] had
achieved majority status prior to repudiation"); Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519 (pointing out
that no representation election was ever held, or could be held, to prove that the Unions had
achieved majority status).
384. See Brief for Appellee at 13, Mar-Len, 906 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1990) (No. 894456) (noting that as of the date that the NLRB announced its decision in Deklewa, the work
being performed on the DeRidder project had been completed).
385. See C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 356 (pointing out that the prehire agreement in
issue, even if automatically renewed, had expired five years prior to the Board's ruling on the
case).
386. See Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 520 (finding that "the relationship between the parties ha[d] been terminated" over four years prior to the adjudication of the case); see also
Reply Brief in Support of Petitioner's Petition for Review at 23 & n.24, C.E.K. Indus., 921
F.2d 350 (1st Cir. 1990) (No. 89-2008) (pointing out that there were no longer any CEK
employees since CEK was no longer in operation and had been out of business for seven years
when the Board finally rendered its decision).
387. See C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 357 (pointing out there was no evidence of the
Union's majority status and that the Cam-Ful's and CEK's actions were entirely lawful under
pre-Deklewa law); Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 203-04 & n.4 (finding that there was no evidence
that the Union had achieved majority status and that Mar-Len's repudiation was lawful under
pre-Deklewa law); Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519 (pointing out that Mesa Verde's action was
entirely lawful under pre-Deklewa law).
388. These circuit courts generally recognized out that the Board's new Deklewa opinion
forced the respective employers to comply with the prehire agreement until its expiration, regardless of whether the union had achieved majority status. See C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at
357; Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 203-04; Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519. Hence, all three employers'
repudiations would have been unlawful under Deklewa.
389. See C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 358 (concluding "that this dispute [wa]s one in
which manifest injustice would result from the retroactive application of Deklewa."); MarLen, 906 F.2d at 203-04 & n.4 (finding "that it would work inequitable and unjust results to
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ingly, these courts held against retroactivity. 9 0

Therefore, although the six United States Courts of Appeals
cases discussed above have split in their decisions regarding retroactivity, each court has similarly based its holding regarding retroactivity on whether the application of pre-Deklewa law and postDeklewa law would derive two vastly different results for construction industry employers. Where the circuit court found that the
Board's new interpretation of section 8(f) law would subject the respective employer to a different penalty than was previously allowable, the court found "manifest injustice" and held against
retroactivity.
IV. THE INEQUITABLE AND UNJUST EFFECTS OF THE NLRB's
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF Deklewa ON
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY EMPLOYERS

Although an inevitable degree of injustice occurs whenever regulatory agency interpretations are modified or replaced midstream,
agencies are generally justified in immediately applying new and improved rules and regulations. Specifically, the NLRB's prospective

application of its new Deklewa rules to all section 8(f) prehire agreements, effective at the time of its decision, was reasonable. Similarly
reasonable was the Board's prospective application of Deklewa to all
cases where such an agreement had been recently repudiated and in
which an election to test the union's majority status could then have
been held.39 1 "The interests of uniformity, clarity, ease of application
apply Deklewa retroactively."); Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519 n.1 (stating that "it would be
manifestly unjust to apply Deklewa retroactively in this case").
390. See C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 358 (denying the Board's order for enforcement);
Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 204 (refusing to apply Deklewa retroactively and remanding the case
for entry of a judgment of dismissal); Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519 n.1 (holding that the
retroactive application of Deklewa was inappropriate and accordingly affirming the judgment
below).
391. The NLRB's new Deklewa interpretation of section 8(f) prehire agreements, including its anti-repudiation rule, seems entirely reasonable. See NationalAutomatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 735; see also Mourey, supra note 5, at 26 (concluding that the Board's
new Deklewa rules "more adequately respond to the building and construction industry's
needs... [and] are a more manageable block from which the Board can build and refine the
law."). See generally Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1128-34 (discussing and determining the reasonableness of Deklewa).
It is this author's opinion that the NLRB's Deklewa principles are generally reasonable
interpretations of the NLRA. The only major change to NLRB policy wrought by the
Deklewa decision is to deprive both construction industry employers and unions of the ability
to repudiate section 8(f) prehire agreements during the term of a contract. The Board, along
with the United States Supreme Court in Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260 (1983), has
always held that such agreements are voidable, but not void. As a result, they are enforceable
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and effective promotion of fundamental statutory policies all dictate
that result. 3 92 Under certain circumstances, however, reasonableness dictates that the Board's Deklewa holdings should not be uniformly and retroactively applied to all pre-Deklewa repudiation
cases. The following section discusses many of the arguments against
the retroactive application of Deklewa and underscores the inequitable and unjust results which are placed on construction industry employers by such retroactivity.
In Deklewa, the NLRB balanced various competing factors in
determining whether its newly announced anti-repudiation rule
should be retroactively applied to all cases pending before the Board
at any stage. On the one hand, the Board considered the "ill effects
of retroactivity" 3 9 -- the potential unfairness to construction industry
employers of imposing upon them additional obligations and liabilities to which they were not subject when they had entered into section 8(f) agreements under pre-Deklewa law. On the other hand,
the Board noted "the mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles. 3 94
After weighing these factors under the Chenery balancing test,3 5 the
Board concluded that the statutory benefits from its newly announced changes in section 8(f) law far outweighed any hardships
resulting from the immediate and retroactive application of those
until they are repudiated. The Deklewa decision merely deprives the construction industry

employer of the ability to repudiate such an agreement during its term. Deklewa's expansion
of the prehire agreement's section 9(a) characteristics, so that it is enforceable through the
contract term, is adequately supported by the Congressional history governing the construction

industry employer's duty to adhere to a section 8(f) agreement once he or she has voluntarily
entered into such an agreement.

Similarly, the Board's refusal to expand the construction industry employer's duty to adhere to the section 8(f) agreement after contract term is consistent with prior Board law. By

definition, section 8(f) agreements are not the result of employee free choice, but rather, represent the unilateral decision of the employer. The union has not been designated by the

employees as their bargaining representative. While the Board and court-created duty of an
employer to abide by the prehire agreement during its term does confer bargaining representative status, the status is limited to insuring adherence to the contract for its term. Granting the

union the right and duty to engage in post-contract negotiations for a successor agreement
without an express showing of majority support by the employees would eradicate any distinc-

tion between a section 8(f) agreement and a section 9(a) agreement. In addition, such a requirement would do violence to the doctrine of freedom of employee choice which forms the
foundation of the NLRA. Deklewa's expansion of section 8(f) enforceablility is far preferable
to the tortured analysis required of employers and unions alike in order to prove the absence of
..conversion" or a showing of majority support.
392.
393.
394.
395.

National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 735.
Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1389 (citing Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203).
Id.
See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text (discussing the Chenery balancing

test).
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changes.8 96
In balancing the two sides, the Board concluded that several
countervailing interests had justified imposing this additional burden

on those parties who had relied on pre-Deklewa law, including construction industry employers.397 The Board listed these interests as
follows:
First, the Board is doing nothing more than holding parties to the
terms and conditions of 8(f) contracts that were voluntarily entered
into. Second,... the need to serve better the fundamental statutory policies of employee free choice and labor relations stability
compels our actions here. Finally, if we were to apply the new 8(f)
law prospectively only, we would then be required for an indefinite
period of time to perpetuate the administrative and litigational difficulties entailed in application of arcane current law to all pending

8(f) cases.398

While these countervailing interests generally have merit, the advancement of these interests through retroactive application is questionable at best.
First, while the NLRB offered, as support of Deklewa retroactivity, the countervailing interest of "holding parties to the terms and
conditions of 8(f) contracts which are voluntarily entered into,"899
the furtherance of this purpose is clearly debatable. Rather than
holding the parties to their voluntarily assumed obligations, retroactive application of the Board's new Deklewa interpretations could,
instead, undermine the prior prehire agreements between the respective parties. 40 0 The right to repudiate a section 8(f) prehire agreement is admittedly a key element upon which parties rely in entering
new contracts and in modifying existing ones. 40 1 Hence, refusing to
apply Deklewa retroactively to either construction industry employers or unions would be more consistent with the terms of the respective agreements since this would hold the parties to the original
terms which they voluntarily entered into, not those which the Board
would be forcing upon them.
Second, the NLRA's overarching statutory objectives-which
396.

Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1389.

397. Id.
398.

Id.

399. Id.
400. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Welfare Fund, 672 F. Supp. at 294. (noting that
retroactive application of Deklewa could specifically undermine the prior contracts between the
construction industry employer and union involved).
401.

See id.
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the Board found to compel retroactive application of its new antirepudiation rule-may not be pertinent in all cases arising under
section 8(f) prehire agreements.40 2 Specifically, the retroactive application of the Board's new Deklewa interpretations may not serve either the policy of employee free choice or labor relations stability in
cases where the parties no longer have any relationship that retroactive application could affect. Under these circumstances, the Board's
remedies, this late in the game, fail to serve the NLRA's objectives.
The NLRB and unions may contend that employee free choice
suffers if the Deklewa rule is not applied retroactively because courts
lack the ability to conduct an election allowing employees to express
their preference.4 0 3 While this argument is persuasive, it ignores the
fact that in all cases "involving strictly historical disputes, a repre40 4 Concomisentation election can no longer be effectively held."
tantly, an employee's right to expression of free choice can no longer
be asserted in this instance and retroactivity will not further this
congressional statutory objective.40 5
Likewise, the beneficial effect of retroactive application of
Deklewa on the stability of the labor relationship between a con4 06
struction industry employer and the respective unions is dubious.
Even if, pursuant to Deklewa, a court held an employer's repudiation
ineffective, it is likely that the contractual relation between the parties would appear to have long since terminated for several other
reasons.40 7 Hence, the stabilizing effect of retroactive application on
402. In Deklewa, the NLRB noted that the fundamental objectives of the NLRA, and
specifically section 8(f), were to advance employee free choice in choosing a bargaining representative, and provide greater labor relations stability in the construction industry. Deklewa,
282 N.L.R.B. at 1382; see Ornamental Iron Workers, 843 F.2d at 778. The Board concluded
that its new interpretations better complimented the overarching congressional purposes behind the NLRA. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1389.
403. See, e.g., Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519 (noting that the Laborers had raised this
argument).
404. Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519; National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 735.
405. NLRA Member Stevens pointed out in his concurring opinion that the Board's
decision "preserves and vitalizes... an election, guaranteed by the 8(f) proviso-for determining more accurately employee sentiment." Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1396 (Stevens, Member,
concurring). However, in "strictly historical disputes," a representation election can no longer
be effectively held. See Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519. Therefore, the argument that retroactive
application of the Board's new interpretations as announced in Deklewa furthers the congressional statutory objective of employee free choice underlying section 8(f) of the NLRA is
meritless.
406. ConstructionIndus. Welfare Fund, 672 F. Supp. at 294.
407. See id. Such reasons could include the completion of the respective construction
project(s), see, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 13, Mar-Len, 906 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1990) (No. 894456) (noting that as of the date that the NLRB announced its decision in Deklewa, the work
being performed on the DeRidder project had been completed), the expiration of the contract
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the relations between the parties would be negligible, at best. 40 8
For example, in C.E.K. Industrial Mechanical Contractors,0 0
at the time when the case was finally adjudicated, the parties no
longer had any relationship that could be affected by retroactive application. The contract at issue, even if it had renewed automatically
in 1983, expired in 1984. CEK, a construction employer, had no employees since 1984, and thus a representation election could no
longer be held. As a result, when the First Circuit finally ruled on
the case six years later, there were no employees to protect. Retroactivity, therefore, could not further effective expression of employee
free choice, and could not damage the maintenance of labor stability
in this particular construction setting.4 10
by its own terms, see, e.g., C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 356 (pointing out that the prehire
agreement in issue, even if automatically renewed, had expired five years prior to the Board's
ruling on the case), or because circumstances have changed with the passage of time, see
NationalAutomatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 735 n.4 (noting that, in Deklewa, the underlying circumstances had "changed with the passage of time"); see, e.g., Reply Brief in Support
of Petitioner's Petition for Review at 23 & n.24, C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d 350 (1st Cir. 1990)
(No. 89-2008) (pointing out that there were no longer any CEK employees since CEK was no
longer in operation and had been out of business for seven years when the Board finally rendered its decision); Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 520 (finding that "the relationship between the
parties ha[d] been terminated" over four years prior to the adjudication of the case).
408. See Construction Indus. Welfare Fund, 672 F. Supp. at 294.
409. 921 F.2d 350 (1st Cir. 1990); see supra notes 321-377 and accompanying text
(discussing the case in detail).
410. Federal Courts have been charged by congress with "responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 490 (1951); see Emhart Indus. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 372, 379 (2d Cir. 1990). For this
reason, courts "must withhold enforcement of orders that will not effectuate any reasonable
policy of the act, even where the problems with the order are caused primarily by the lapse of
time between the practices complained of and the remedy granted." Emhart Indus., 907 F.2d
at 379; cf. NLRB v. Koenig Iron Works, Inc., 856 F.2d 1, 3-4 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying enforcement of bargaining order where twelve years expired between the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and order); NLRB v. J. Coty Messenger Serv., 763 F.2d 92, 99-101
(2d Cir. 1985) (denying enforcement of bargaining order where board failed to analyze the
effect of passage of time and employee turnover). Additionally, Board orders should be reversed when they have no reasonable basis in law, Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of
America, Local Union No.1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 156, 166 (1971), or are
"fundamentally inconsistent with the structure of the Act," American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965).
Employing this reasoning, the Second Circuit has recently refused to enforce a NLRB
order that had arisen out of a historical dispute. See Emhart Indus., 907 F.2d at 380. In
Emhart, the Board held that the company's action in 1983 and 1984 gave rise to an unfair
labor practice. Id. at 376. Refusing to enforce the Board's decision, in part because the realities of the relationship between the parties had changed, the Second Circuit stated that it
"believe[d] that the board's inexcusable delay in deciding this case--or, more precisely, the
effects of that delay on the efficacy of the Board's remedy-provide[d] an independent ground
for denying enforcement." Id. at 378. The court found that due to the passage of time-six
years-the underlying situation at Emhart Industries had changed. Id. at 379-80 (pointing out
that the only plant which the Board's cease and desist order applied to had closed down five
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Finally, the Board points out as one of its countervailing interests that it would be burdened with administrative and litigational
difficulties if it must apply two different sets of law-its prior section
8(f) interpretations and its new interpretations-to all pending section 8(f) cases.4 11 Indeed, most cases involving retroactive application of newly promulgated agency interpretations will implicate some
regulatory interest. 412 Retroactivity relieves the agency from the administrative inconvenience of contemporaneously applying two conflicting sets of rules or interpretations. Retroactivity also enables the
413 "These
agency to implement its new policy changes immediately.
' 41 4 For instance, the
considerations, however, are not overriding.
Board's concern about the litigational difficulties that would result if
its new interpretations of section 8(f) law were to continue to apply,
4 15 Additionally, inconvemay not be at issue in each pending case.
nience resulting from the existence of two contrary interpretations
should not, by itself, substantiate retroactivity. Only when the circumstances result in severe administrative hardships should the reg4 1 6 The Board did
ulatory convenience argument justify retroactivity.
years prior). Consequently, the court held that "the enforcement of the order now not only
would undermine more labor policies that [sic] it would advance, but also would mock reality." Id.
Similarly, the retroactive application of Deklewa in "strictly historical disputes" not only
fails to further the NLRA's statutory policies of employee free choice and labor relations
stability, but clearly undermines more labor policies than it would advance. Retroactivity
under these circumstances also indubitably mocks reality where employees' rights can no
longer be effectively asserted and contractual relations between the parties have long since
terminated.
411. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1389.
412. See Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 213.
413. Id.; see, e.g., Leedom v. IBEW, Local 108, 278 F.2d 237, 242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(noting that the NLRB contended that with retroactive application, its policy changes could be
implemented immediately as opposed to being precluded from "putting its new policies fully
into effect for as long as five years from the date the change was announced.").
414. Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 213. But cf. Leedom v.
IBEW, 278 F.2d at 243 (stating that "[a]dministrative flexibility is, after all, one of the principal reasons for the establishment of the regulatory agencies. It permits valuable experimentation and allows administrative policies to reflect changing policy views.").
415. See, e.g., National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 735 (noting that "'the
Board's concern about the litigation difficulties that would result should the old rule continue
to apply [wa]s not present" in the case before it). For instance, majority status questions are
not properly resolvable in LMRA section 301 litigation, Id.; LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1988); see generally C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 359; Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 203-04, and
therefore, litigation difficulties in applying two different sets of rules would not exist.
416. Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 213; see e.g., Leedom v.
not
IBEW, 278 F.2d at 243 (stating that "[h]ere in the nature of the problem the Board could
new
promulgate these rules prospectively without having to wait up to five years to put its
policies into full effect.").
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not mention any such problems in Deklewa.
When an agency overrules an interpretation that has been in
effect for a considerable period of time, the administrative interest
that the agency asserts will be less compelling. As noted below, the
longer an interpretation has been in effect, the more likely it is to
generate reliance and expectations regarding that interpretation. 41 7
In such a situation, it is less probable that there will be an overriding
need to retroactively apply a new interpretation. If a governmental
agency has endorsed an interpretation over a considerable period of
time, "it is difficult for it to argue, absent significantly altered circumstances, that it has a compelling need to replace that interpreta418
tion immediately.
Prior to Deklewa, the Board had consistently upheld its earlier
R.J. Smith interpretation of section 8(f) law which it originally announced in 1971, and which was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Higdon in 1978. As a result, as noted below, the Board's earlier in417. See infra notes 441-443 and accompanying text; see, e.g., C.H. Guenther & Sons,
Inc. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 983, 986 (5th Cir.) (concluding that retroactive effect was permissible
since the new decision had been foreshadowed by prior judicial and administrative precedent
which had undercut the then-existing precedent), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); American
Mach. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321, 1328 (5th Cir. 1970) (rejecting assertions that
agency's new decision came as a complete surprise, and noting that the agency's prior decision
"demonstrated the erosion of employers' freedom in treating jobless economic strikers as new
applicants."); see Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 213; cf. C. SANDS,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.05, at 371 (4th ed. 1986) (stating that "[w]ith
further relevance to the question of what expectations can be taken to have been reasonably
and seriously held, there is authority for greater tolerance toward retroactive application of
laws which coincide with long-standing public policy.").
The general principles of reliance that apply to judicial decisions overruling prior precedent apply to administrative interpretations as well:
[A]lthough litigants may have actually relied on a prior rule in conducting their
daily affairs, courts only protect justifiable or reasonable reliance. For example,
courts have generally not protected reliance when the overruled decision has been
repeatedly weakened by cases that stopped short of explicitly overruling it or when
the prior rule's abandonment has been clearly foreshadowed. In these situations, a
litigant's claim that his reliance was justified becomes "weaker and weaker as the
warning signs mount."
Comment, Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 33 ALA. L. REV. 463, 478 (1982)
(authored by J.B.R.). See also Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEx. L. REv.
425, 430-32 (1982) (discussing the rationality of expectations); Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations, supra note 94, at 211 n.190; Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive
Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 947 (1962) (stating that "[d]ecades of
cases limiting the original decision to its facts, distinguishing it from almost indistinguishable
situations, declining to overrule it in apologetic tones that seem to admit that consistency
would compel such an overruling . . . would seem to make it a weak reed upon which to
rely.").
418. Retroactive Regulatory Interpetations,supra note 94, at 213; see NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1966).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/6

64

Fineman: The Retroactive Application of Deklewa: Inequitable and Unjust Re
Retroactive Application of Deklewa

1991]

terpretation generated reliance and expectations among parties in
the construction industry." 9 For instance, the six circuit court cases
discussed in the previous section all involved construction industry
employers who had relied on the Board's earlier interpretation when
they repudiated their respective prehire agreements. Even though the
R.J.
Board pointed out that the development of the law "under
420 it still
deficiencies,"
significant
exposed
Smith and Higdon [had]
allowed its prior interpretation to remain in effect for sixteen
years.4 1 Additionally, the Board did not rely on significantly altered
circumstances to justify its "'abrupt' departure from past precedent." 422 Rather, it based its sharp changes on the "unsettled and
confusing nature of that precedent" which had perpetuated over a
long period of time. 23 Under these circumstances, the existence of a
compelling or overriding need for the Board to apply its new interpretation retroactively is doubtful.
While the Board listed the factors discussed above, it failed to
elaborate on or, in some instances, even mention other relevant considerations. Such considerations are essential in determining whether
the Board's alleged benefits of retroactivity outweighed the new obligations and liabilities imposed on certain parties. First, the considerations relevant in determining whether the anti-repudiation rule
should be applied retroactively vary substantially from case to case.
Therefore, it is analytically unsound to observe the rule in a vacuum.
The anti-repudiation rule "must be understood against the background of the overriding principle enunciated in Deklewa from
which it is derived: that majority status disputes arising under 8(f)
agreements should be resolved by election rather than by litigation. ' 42 4 According to pre-Deklewa law, construction prehire agreements were unilaterally voidable unless and until the relevant union
419.
420.
421.

See infra notes 447-450 and accompanying text.
Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1378.
The Board's new Deklewa interpretation overruling R.J. Smith were not issued

until 1987, sixteen years after the Board first ruled in R.J. Smith that section 8(f) of the
NLRA allowed the unilateral repudiation of construction industry prehire agreements. See
Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377.
422. Id. at 1389 n.61.
423. Id. at 1389. In Deklewa, the Board found flaws permeating the entire existing 8(f)
analytic scheme, and "determined that minor adjustments or changes to current law would not
[have been] sufficient to rectify its deficiencies." 282 N.L.R.B. at 1380 n.16. Even though the
Board reiterated several times that changes were necessary to the existing law, it did not point

out any particular incidents or recent occurrences which specifically compelled it to retroactively apply Deklewa immediately.
424. National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 735.
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achieved majority status.425 However, in cases involving "strictly historical disputes," a representation election can no longer be effectively held.426 Thus, the uniform retroactive application of the
Board's anti-repudiation rule to these cases would only give selective
427
retroactive effect to the Deklewa holding.
The three circuit cases holding against the retroactive application of Deklewa all involved "strictly historical disputes. ' 428 In these
cases, the construction industry employers repudiated their prehire
agreements with the unions long before the cases were finally adjudicated. These cases were pending for some time and representation
elections could no longer be held either because the construction
projects involved had been completed, the appropriate prehire agreements expired by their own terms, or circumstances changed with
the passage of time. In addition, the respective unions presented no
evidence that they achieved majority status. For example, in C.E.K.
Industrial Mechanical Contractors,429 by the time the First Circuit
adjudicated the case, there was no longer any CEK employees, and a
representation election had never been held. Thus, whether CEK
lawfully repudiated its prehire agreement with the union was simply
a "historical dispute" since a representation election by the CEK
employees could no longer be effectively held and union majority status could not be determined.
Second, the unfairness of retroactive application of the Board's
new anti-repudiation rule to construction industry employers is most
manifest in cases such as these. 43 0 For instance, retroactivity would
subject construction industry employers to harsh penalties for taking
action that was entirely lawful and sanctioned by both the NLRB
and the federal courts under pre-Deklewa law. 431 Additionally, these
425. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.

426. Mesa Verde, 895 F.2d at 519; National Automatic Sprinkler,680 F. Supp. at 735;
see Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 204 n.4; see also C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 358.
427. See National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 735.
428. See C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 358; Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 203-04; Mesa Verde,
895 F.2d at 519.
429. 921 F.2d 350 (Ist Cir. 1990); see supra notes 321-377 and accompanying text
(discussing the case in detail).
430. See National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 735.
431. See Mesa Verde, 885 F.2d at 597; National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at
735.

Under the retroactive application of Deklewa, a construction employer who strictly adheres to the terms of a prehire agreement with the employees of the union represented in the
agreement, and then repudiates under the law established and enforced by the appropriate
bodies would be held liable, even if that activity took place several years before the NLRB
changed its interpretation in Deklewa. See, e.g., C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 359 (showing that
C.E.K. repudiated its agreement in 1983, four years before the Deklewa ruling); Mar-Len, 906

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/6

66

1991]

Fineman: The Retroactive Application of Deklewa: Inequitable and Unjust Re
Retroactive Application of Deklewa

penalties would be inequitably and unjustly imposed without affording the construction industry employers "the opportunity to have
their assertion of the union's lack of majority status tested either by
election or by litigation."4 2
Third, the Board's retroactive application of Deklewa contradicts fundamental legal doctrine. The concept that everyone is presumed to know the law, which is based on the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse,' has become a fundamental doctrine of
this country's legal system. 433 This doctrine, however, cannot be equitably utilized when the law is uncertain and unknown, 3 4 and can
perpetrate unfairness when "unanticipated regulatory interpretations
are applied retroactively to the detriment of legitimate reliance interests. '435 Nonetheless, the Board held for retroactive application of its
new regulatory interpretations even though construction industry
employers lacked fair notice of these new interpretations when they
legally repudiated their agreements. The Board has done so even
though it previously construed section 8(f) of the NLRA differently
for the sixteen years prior to Deklewa. Therefore, the Board's retroactive application of Deklewa subjects construction industry employers to penalties for actions taking place several years before the
NLRB changed its interpretations in Deklewa, and unbelievably, at
F.2d at 201 (noting that Mar-Len repudiated its agreement in 1984, three years before the
Deklewa ruling); Bufco, 899 F.2d at 609 (stating that Bufco repudiated its agreement in 1982,
seven years before the Deklewa ruling); Mesa Verde, 885 F.2d at 595 (showing that Mesa
Verde repudiated its agreement in 1984, three years before the Deklewa ruling); W.L. Miller
Co., 871 F.2d at 747 (noting that Miller repudiated its agreement in 1983, four years before
the Deklewa ruling). This was the specific case in Deklewa since Deklewa repudiated its agreement in 1983, four years before the NLRB's ruling. See OrnamentalIron Workers, 843 F.2d
at 772.
432. Mesa Verde, 885 F.2d at 597 (quoting National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F.
Supp. at 735).
433. Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 218.
Over a century ago, Mr. Justice Holmes avowed that "to admit the excuse [of ignorance
of the law] at all would be to encourage ignorance where the lawmaker has determined to
make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger
interests on the other side of the scales." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881). See also

J. AUSTIN,

LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE

498 (1869).

434. See C. SANDS, supra note 417, § 41.02, at 340-41:
It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that retroactive application of new
laws is usually unfair. There is general consensus that notice or warning of the rules
should be given in advance of the actions whose effects are to be judged. The hackneyed maxim that everyone is held to know the law, itself a principle of dubious
wisdom, nevertheless presupposes that the law is at least susceptible of being known.
But this is not possible concerning law that has yet to exist.
See also B. CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 3 (1924) (stating that "[l]aw as a guide to
conduct is reduced to the level of mere futility if it is unknown and unknowable.").
435. Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 218.
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a time when the Board's contrary interpretations were not susceptible to being known.
Fourth, the retroactive application of the Deklewa principle, involving altered rules of substantive conduct, also clearly defeats reasonable private expectations existing at the time of the relevant con4 36
duct regarding the right to lawfully repudiate prehire agreements.
Generally, retroactive application of new laws, rules or regulations,
"present special problems for a legal system because they can [easily] upset settled expectations, and can deprive citizens of notice of,
and an opportunity to comply with, legal requirements. 437 The First
Circuit has recently suggested that "the touchstone for deciding the
question of retroactivity is whether retroactive application of a newly
436. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 358; see American Trucking Ass'ns, - U.S. at .,
110 S. Ct. at 2338 (1990); see also Demars, 907 F.2d at 1239-40.
437. See Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 167-68.
Retroactive application of new laws is suspect to the upsetting settled expectations based
on prior law. See, e.g., Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250,
1260 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating that "[r]etroactive laws interfere with the legally-induced settled
expectations of private parties to a greater extent than do prospective enactments."); Adams
Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077, 1080 (Ist Cir. 1970) (noting that "laws that unsettle settled rights can be harsh, and they deserve a special scrutiny.");
Leedom v. IBEW, Local 108, 278 F.2d 237, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (finding that "[the vice
inherent in retroactivity is, of course, that it tends to destroy predictability and to undercut
reliance--both important aims of the law."); see Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 692 (1960) (noting that
"[p]erhaps the most fundamental reason why retroactive legislation is suspect stems from the
principle that a person should be able to plan his conduct with reasonable certainty of the legal
consequences."); C. SANDms, supra note 417, § 41.05, at 366:
One of the fundamental considerations of fairness recognized in every legal system
is that settled expectations honestly arrived at with respect to substantial interests
ought not to be defeated. There is evidence that results achieved through application of judicial instinct, manifested in the pattern of decisions on retroactivity
problems, are perhaps best explained in terms of this fundamental principle of
justice.
(Emphasis added.)
Retroactive application of new laws also deprives individuals of a chance to appropriately
guide their actions without penalty. See Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61
TEx. L. REv. 425, 426-27 (1982). Munzer points out that:
The central purpose of law is to guide behavior. When legislatures create rules, a
person properly forms expectations about how the legal system will respond to his
actions. Retroactive laws frustrate the central purpose of law by disrupting expectations and actions taken in reliance on them. This disruption is always costly and
rarely defensible. Moreover, retroactive lawmaking violates what is often called the
rule of law, namely, an entitlement of persons to guide their behavior by impartial
rules that are publicly fixed in advance. This violation undermines human autonomy
by hindering the ability of persons to form plans and carry them out with due regard for the rights of others.
Id.; see also Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J.LEGAL STUD. 373, 391 (1977) (stating that "[a]
person is morally entitled to know in advance what legal character and consequences his acts
have."); C. SANDS, supra note 417, § 41.02, at 340.
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announced principle would alter substantive rules of conduct and dis-

appoint private expectations."438 Additionally, and most importantly,
in its last term, the Supreme Court stressed that:
[w]hen the Court concludes that a law-changing decision should
not be applied retroactively, its decision is usually based on its perception that such application would have a harsh and disruptive
effect on those who have relied on prior law .... If the operative
conduct or events occurred before the law-changing decision, 439a
court should apply the law prevailing at the time of the conduct.

By retroactively applying the Board's new anti-repudiation rule, the
Board clearly upsets settled expectations among construction industry employers who have relied on prior well-established Board law.
The simple existence of an expectation does not, however, necessarily justify protection. Some well-grounded expectations deserve
protection, while others do not. Courts must ascertain the legitimacy
of a particular expectation as well as the severity of the new interpretation's impact, and balance these findings against the regulatory
interests advanced by the respective agency. 440 Reliance on an

agency's interpretation is greater legitimized if that interpretation
has remained in effect for an established period of time without being modified or overruled. 441 The courts, including the Supreme
a
Court, have held that a person may legitimately conclude that 442
reliance.
of
worthy
and
correct
both
is
longstanding interpretation
438. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 357-58 n.7 (citing Demars, 907 F.2d at 1239-40). In
Demars, the First Circuit stated that "[u]nder the manifest injustice standard, 'the disappointment of private expectations that results from the implementation of a new rule must be balanced against public interest in the enforcement of that rule.'" 907 F.2d at 1240 (quoting
New England Power Co. v. United States, 693 F.2d 239, 245 (1st Cir. 1982)). Accord AledoGarcia v. Puerto Rico Nat'l Guard, 887 F.2d 354, 357 (1st Cir. 1989); Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1084 (Ist Cir. 1986).
110 S. Ct. 2323, 2338
U.S. 439. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, (1990).
Also, along the same lines, the Supreme Court has expressed in Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988), that "[c]ongressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result." Id. at 208.
440. See Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 199. See generally
supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text (discussing the Chenery balancing test).
441. See, e.g., Mehta v. INS, 574 F.2d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that a new
interpretation could be retroactively applied since the alleged reliance on prior administrative
interpretation occurred almost a year after the interpretation was revoked); see Retroactive
Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 210 & n.186; see also Traynor, Quo Vadis,
Prospective Overruling:A Question of JudicialResponsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 547-48
(1977).
442. See Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 210. "The Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that long-standing interpretations are entitled to greater def-
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Additionally, they have emphasized that such regulatory interpretations should not be overturned lightly.443
In Deklewa, the NLRB ascertained the legitimacy of the expectations involved as well as the severity of impact resulting from the
Board's new interpretation, and balanced these findings against the
regulatory interests advanced by its new holdings. The Board concluded that the stated countervailing interests far outweighed any
hardships to parties affected by retroactivity, and stated that the reliance interest involved:
[wa]s not a particularly strong one in light of the purposes that
Congress sought to achieve under [section] 8(f). The interest that
is entitled to protection is the ability of an employer to avail itself
of the Board processes to determine whether there is continued
support to undergird the union and the agreement. The new rule,
which affirms the Board's election procedures for resolving that iserence." Id. at 210 n.187; see Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965) (noting that the agency's
interpretation was longstanding, and that others had relied on it as a basis for giving deference); McLaren v. Fleischer, 257 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1921) (holding that a "practical construction given to an act of Congress ...by those charged with the duty of executing it is entitled
to great respect and, if acted upon for a number of years, will not be disturbed except for
cogent reasons."); see also Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L.
REv. 398, 406-07, 408-09 (1941) (stating that "[wihen a regulation has remained unchanged
for many years, without contest or alteration, it seems obviously bad judicial tax administration to substitute the Court's construction of the statute for the administrative interpretation
which has been relied on for so long a time.").
On the other hand, Weaver points out that:
Reliance is correspondingly less appropriate when the governing agency has warned
against such reliance. The agency can provide this warning either directly, such as
when an interpretation is questioned or overruled, or indirectly, such as when the
interpretation has been frequently modified. These actions put the regulated person
on notice that the agency may depart from the interpretation, and therefore, that
reliance may be inappropriate.
Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 210-11; see, e.g., C.H. Guenther &
Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 983 (5th Cir.) (concluding that retroactive effect was permissible since the new decision had been foreshadowed by prior judicial and administrative precedent which had undercut the then-existing precedent), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970);
American Mach. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321, 1328 (5th Cir. 1970) (rejecting assertions
that agency's new decision came as a complete surprise, and noting that the agency's prior
decision "demonstrated the erosion of employers' freedom in treating jobless economic strikers
as new applicants.").
However, even in this situation, reliance claims should not be summarily rejected
since those subject to an interpretation can never be sure either if or when an overruling will come about. Thus, although the regulated person may hedge his expectations on an interpretation, he or she must still respect it. Most importantly, even
though an agency may indicate that it might or will overrule a prior interpretation,
it might not touch upon which interpretation will replace it.
RetroactiveRegulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 211; see, e.g., Stewart Capital Corp.
v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1983).
443. See Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 210.
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apsue, does not seriously detract from what an employer should 444
propriately expect in the way of protection under the old rule.
The Board also pointed out that some employers probably had relied
on R.J. Smith as a means of repudiating a prehire agreements. 4
However, the Board noted that due to the infirmities and uncertainties in the pre-Deklewa law, it was less likely that a construction
have acted in reliance on that
industry employer could knowingly
446
liability.
avoid
to
law in order
As noted above, even though the Board pointed out that the development of the law "under R.J. Smith and Higdon had exposed
significant deficiencies, 447 it still allowed its prior interpretations to
remain in effect for sixteen years. 448 As a direct result, the Board's
earlier interpretations induced widespread reliance and expectations
among construction industry employers in the construction industry.449 These expectations were well-grounded, and this reliance was
legitimized when the Board continued to effectuate its prior interpretation of section 8(f) law for a substantial period of time without
modification or reversal.450
Additionally, the Board's argument that the legitimate reliance
interests of employers are unimportant due to other superseding interests is faulty. The Board's argument fails to take into account
that in "strictly historical disputes," a representation election can no
longer be effectively held. Therefore, the employer's interest in availing itself of the Board processes to determine whether there is majority support to undergird the union and the respective prehire agreement is impossible either by election or by litigation.451 Hence, the
retroactive application of Deklewa: (1) leaves the construction industry employer without any interests protected; (2) seriously detracts
444. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1389 n.61.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 1389.
447. Id. at 1378.
448. See supra note 421 and accompanying text.
449. The six United States Courts of Appeals cases discussed in the preceding section all
involved construction industry employers who had relied on the unilateral right to repudiate
prehire agreements under pre-Deklewa law. The fact that these employers conducted business
in six different regions of the country supports the conclusion that widespread reliance and
expectations based on the Board's prior interpretations existed.
450. NLRB Member Stevens specifically recognized in his concurring opinion that the
Board was overturning a reading of section 8(f) of the NLRA that the Board "not only [had]
previously embraced but [had] defended before the Supreme Court of the United States."
Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1391.
451. See National Automatic Sprinkler, 680 F. Supp. at 735; cf. Construction Indus.
Welfare Fund, 672 F. Supp. at 294.
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from what an employer should appropriately expect in the way of
protection under the old rule; and (3) yields results which are contrary to the purposes that Congress sought to achieve under section

8(f).
Finally, there are procedural reasons that counsel against retroactive application of Deklewa in the context of an unfair labor practice charge. 52 For instance, an NLRB ruling that a construction employer has committed an unfair labor practice in violation of section
8(a)(5) appears to have no basis in Board practice prior to
Deklewa.451 Before Deklewa, unrepudiated section 8(f) agreements
previously were enforceable under section 301 of the LMRA. 454 But
until Deklewa, it was settled that section 8(f) did not "expand the
duty of an employer under section 8(a)(5), which is to bargain with
a majority representative, to require the employer to bargain with a
union with which he has executed a prehire agreement but which has
failed to win majority support in the covered unit. ' '45 5 Thus, it is
apparent that a section 8(f) agreement was not generally enforceable
under section 8(a)(5).4 5 6 It is, at the very least, arguable that under
the R.J. Smith rule-in effect when any proceeding is commenced
before Deklewa-a construction industry employer could not have
committed an unfair practice under section 8(a)(5) when it refused
to honor a section 8(f) prehire agreement, unless the union had attained majority support and thereby created a full section 9(a) collective bargaining agreement through conversion. 5
In Deklewa, of course, the Board overruled R.J. Smith, abandoning the conversion doctrine and deciding that a section 8(f)
agreement could be enforced through the mechanism of a section
8(a)(5) proceeding. 458 But courts should not be inclined to uphold
and enforce a Board order requesting retroactivity, especially when it
is partially founded on the conclusion that an employer violated section 8(a)(5) at a time when the settled avenue for resolving prehire
45 9
agreement disputes was solely through a section 301 lawsuit.
452. See generally C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 358-59.

453. See id. at 359.
454. See generally Jim McNeff, Inc., 461 U.S. at 270 (enforcing retroactively a monetary obligation created by a prehire agreement under section 301 of the LMRA); Plumbers &
Pipefitters Local Union 72 v. John Payne Co., 850 F.2d 1535, 1539-40 (11th Cir. 1988).
455.

Higdon, 434 U.S. at 346.

456. C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 359.
457. See Higdon, 434 U.S. at 345; id.
458. 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377.
459. See C.E.K. Indus., 921 F.2d at 359.
In this instance, hostility towards the retroactive application of Deklewa can be compared
to the hostility against retroactive criminal laws. "Hostility towards retroactive laws is re-
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V.

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that the NLRB's retroactive application of
fiected in the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution, which proscribes Congress
and the states from passing retroactive criminal laws ...." Retroactive Regulatory Interpre3 (stating that "[n]o Bill of Attaintations, supra note 94, at 168; U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9, cl.
der or ex post facto Law shall be passed."); U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10, el. 1 (stating that "[n]o
state shall.., pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law . . . ."). See, e.g., C. SANDS, supra
note 417, § 41.01, at 338 (noting that "[s]tatutes which retroactively impose or increase the
severity of criminal laws concerning preenactment offenses are called ex post facto laws. They
are generally prohibited by specific constitutional provisions."). See generally Crosskey, The
True Meaning of the ConstitutionalProhibitionof Ex-Post-FactoLaws, U. Cm. L. REv. 539
(1947). The ex post facto clause only prohibits retroactive criminal laws. See Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (defining an ex post facto law as "[e]very law that makes an
action done before the passing of a law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and
punishes such action."); see also Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerationsin
Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL. L. REV. 216, 222 (1960):
The limitation of the criminal sanction seems to rest, ultimately, on a belief in free
will. A man is a criminal only if he chooses to do that which society calls criminal.
Seen from this perspective the absolute ban on ex-post facto criminal laws is explicable as a ban on condemning a man when the element of choice which society has
chosen as its basis of condemnation ... could not have been present .... On this
rationale, the wisdom of Calder v. Bull is evident. Choice is seldom an essential
condition for the civil imposition of duties or deprivations of rights and liberties,
because no one is being morally condemned for having chosen wrongly.
The proscription against ex post facto laws insures that citizens receive fair warning of the
potentially criminal nature of their conduct and restricts governmental power by restraining
arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation. See generally Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386 (1798).
Generally, the ex post facto clause does not apply to administrative agency regulatory
interpretations. Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,supra note 94, at 168 n.4. Contra
Hayward v. United States Parole Comm'n, 502 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (D. Minn. 1980) (holding
that "[w]hen Congress has delegated to an agency the power to make rules, instead of formulating rules itself, those rules are an extension of the statute for purposes of the ex post facto
clause."). Additionally, the clause applies, by its terms, only to legislative, not judicial, lawmaking. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977) (holding that judicial decisions
are not subject to the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation); Bouie v. City
of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352-55 (1964); see also Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations,
supra note 94, at 168 n.4. But see C. SANDS, supra note 417, § 42.02, at 446 n.2 (noting that
"[t]here are opinions both ways on this issue."). This is true even though regulations have been
held to have "the same force as statutes." C. SANDS, supra note 417, § 42.02, at 445; see, e.g.,
Allen v. Haddon, 536 F. Supp. 586, 595 (D. Colo. 1982). Nevertheless, while the ex post facto
clause may not apply to judicial actions, the due process clause does. See Marks v. United
States, supra, at 192 (holding that the right to fair warning under the Ex Post Facto Clause
"is protected against judicial action by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.");
Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra, at 353-54 (stating that "[i]f a state legislature is barred by
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court
is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction."); Popkin, The CollaborativeModel of Statutory Interpretation,61 S.CAL. L. REV.
543, 581 (1988) (stating that "[t]he ex post facto clause is now applied to retroactive cases
through the due process clause.").
A strong argument can be made that agency regulatory interpretations should, like judicial interpretations, be exempt from the ex post facto clause. See Retroactive Regulatory In-
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Deklewa works manifestly inequitable and unjust results by effectively punishing construction industry employers for conduct that
was lawful when it occurred.4 60 While the countervailing interests
announced by the Board in Deklewa generally have merit, the advancement of these interests through retroactive application is questionable at best, and completely fail to justify the hardships inflicted
on these employers.46 1

The six United States Courts of Appeals cases addressing this
retroactivity issue split in their decisions for justifiable reasons.
Under certain circumstances, pre-Deklewa law and post-Deklewa
law derive two vastly different results for construction industry employers. In cases where the unions had achieved majority status, even
under pre-Deklewa law, employers could not have lawfully repudiated their prehire agreements. 4 12 In these cases where pre- and postDeklewa law would yield the same results, the courts held that the
retroactive application of Deklewa would work no manifest injustice
on the respective employers.4 63 In cases where there was no evidence

of majority support by the union and a representation election could
terpretations,supra note 94, at 168 n.4. For instance, "[i]n many instances, an agency's adjudicatory arm will render interpretations, making them judicial in character." Id.; cf.
Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation,supra, at 581 (noting that "cases become
more like statutes by being applied prospectively.") Additionally, Weaver points out that:
"Although the ex post facto clause deals with criminal laws, ouie of its key components, the requirement of notice, does extend to civil laws and therefore to [agency]
regulatory interpretations. This notice requirement is reflected in the prohibition
against laws that are unduly vague or ambiguous.
Id. (collecting cases for support). Lastly, since it is the "general consensus that notice and
warning of [a] rule should be given in advance of the actions whose effects are to be judged,"
C. SANDS, supra note 417, § 41.02, at 340, retroactively applying newly promulgated agency
interpretations without providing notice seems to be in direct opposition to the fundamental
purposes of the ex post facto clause.
Hence, by upholding and enforcing a Board order that a construction industry employer is
in violation of section 8(a)(5) for actions taken at a time when the settled avenue for resolving
prehire agreement disputes was solely through a LMRA section 301 lawsuit, an argument can
be made that courts would be violating the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. This is particularly applicable in Deklewa-related cases since notice that a section 8(f)
prehire agreement could be enforced through the mechanism of a section 8(a)(5) proceeding
was not susceptible to construction industry employers prior to the Board's new holding in
Deklewa.
460. See supra text accompanying notes 391-459 (presenting and analyzing in detail
various arguments against the retroactive application of Deklewa and pointing out the inequitable and unjust results which are placed on construction industry employers by retroactivity).
461. See supra text accompanying notes 391-423 (presenting and analyzing in detail the
NLRB's arguments in support of the retroactive application of Deklewa).
462. See supra text accompanying note 380.
463. See supra text accompanying notes 127-238 (analyzing in detail the decisions of
the various circuit courts of appeals cases for the retroactive application of Deklewa).
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no longer be held, under pre-Deklewa law, employers had lawfully
repudiated their prehire agreements.464 However, these repudiations
would not be lawful under post-Deklewa law.465 In these cases, since
pre- and post-Deklewa law yielded substantially different results, the
courts found undeniable manifest injustice and properly held against
retroactivity.4 6
Retroactivity subjects construction industry employers to harsh
penalties for having taken actions which, prior to Deklewa, were entirely lawful and sanctioned by both the NLRB and the federal
courts.467 In "strictly historical disputes," these penalties are inequitably and unjustly imposed, since construction industry employers
are not afforded the opportunity to have their assertion of the union's
lack of majority status tested either by election or by litigation.468
Retroactive application of the Board's new anti-repudiation rule also
clearly upsets settled expectations among construction industry employers who have relied on prior well-established Board law. 469 Furthermore, retroactivity in these instances unjustly subjects construction industry employers to section 8(a)(5) unfair practice violations
under the NLRA for taking actions that, under pre-Deklewa law,
would not have constituted unfair practices.47 0 Hence, the retroactive
application of the NLRB's new interpretations regarding section 8(f)
prehire agreements as announced in Deklewa causes inequitable and
unjust results to the detriment of construction industry employers'
legitimate reliance interests.
Howard Douglas Fineman

464. See supra text accompanying note 387.
465. See supra text accompanying note 388.
466. See supra text accompanying notes 239-377 (analyzing in detail the decisions of
the various circuit courts of appeals cases against the retroactive application of Deklewa).

467.
468.
469.
470.

See supra text
See supra text
See supra text
See supra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

note 431.
note 432.
notes 436-451.
notes 452-459.
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